Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Faculty Scholarship
1-1-2010

Close Enough for Government Work: The Committee Rulemaking
Game
Paul Stancil
BYU Law, stancilp@law.byu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Courts Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Paul Stancil, Close Enough for Government Work: The Committee Rulemaking Game, 96 Vɪʀɢɪɴɪᴀ L. Rᴇᴠ.
69 (2010).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

CLOSE ENOUGH FOR GOVERNMENT WORK: THE
COMMITTEE RULEMAKING GAME
PaulJ. Stancil'

PROCEDURAL

rules in U.S. courts often have predictable and
systemic substantive consequences. Yet the vast majority of procedural rules are drafted, debated, and ultimately enacted by a
committee rulemaking process substantially removed from significant legislative or executive supervision. This Article explores the
dynamics of the committee rulemaking process through a gametheoretical lens. The model reveals that inferior players in the committee rulemaking game-advisory committees, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, the Judicial Conference,
and the Supreme Court-are sometimes able to arbitrage congressional transaction costs to obtain results at odds with the results
Congress would prefer in a world without transactioncosts. This Article presents two real-world examples of possible transaction-cost
arbitrage, one involving the 1993 adoption of the "initial disclosures" requirement under the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,and
one involving the implementation of the "means test" requirement of
the 2005 bankruptcy reform statute. Though the normative implications of committee rulemaking are ambiguous, the dynamics of the
game suggest that a better preference fit between Congress and the
membership of the various advisory committees would mitigate the
risks of transactioncost arbitragesubstantially, while retainingmost
of the advantages of the committee rulemaking system.
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INTRODUCTION

Procedure is substance. A slight exaggeration, perhaps, but few
would dispute that rules of practice and procedure can, and often
do, have predictable and systemic substantive effects. For example,
a rule awarding class action defendants their reasonable attorney's
fees if the court refuses to certify a plaintiff class would eviscerate
the class action as a social policy tool.' Liberalization of criminal
discovery rules would reduce plea bargains and overall criminal
conviction rates as defendants obtained additional information
from which reasonable doubt might emerge.2 Elimination of summary judgment in civil cases would change the game for defendants, who could then be legally vindicated only at trial.' Even the
adoption of shorter time limits for motion responses could disproportionately harm litigants with fewer resources.'
And yet Congress continues to entrust rulemaking authority to
the committee rulemaking ("CR") process.! Though the CR process has evolved somewhat since its genesis in the 1930s-a time
when most still believed in a clear divide between the substantive

'Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (mentioning attorney's fees only in the case of a certified

class action).
'Cf. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a) (detailing government disclosure rules).
Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b) (permitting defendants to move for summary judgment).
Cf., e.g., Id. 4(m) (giving plaintiffs 120 days to serve defendants with process and
notice of suit).
'See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077(2006).
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and the procedural-its essential character remains the same.6 The
CR process depends heavily upon inferior actors-area-specific
advisory committees, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure, the Judicial Conference, and the Supreme Courtto develop, refine, and approve procedural rules. Congress trusts
this process to yield procedural systems that benefit from committee expertise without crossing the line into substantive policymaking. Congress also implicitly trusts itself to correct any missteps
those inferior actors may make.' Congress' trust may be misplaced
in both cases.
Committee rulemaking is a game, and the game theory of committee rulemaking suggests that these inferior, non-congressional
players sometimes have substantial ability to enact their own preferences into law, notwithstanding Congress' nominal right to veto
rules it regards as undesirable. Game-theoretical analysis of the
CR process specifically demonstrates that the committee rulemaking game presents opportunities for "transaction-cost arbitrage" in
a variety of circumstances.
Though Congress ostensibly retains the right to reject the results
of committee rulemaking,' its practical ability to do so is constrained substantially by the costs associated with active congressional oversight. Inferior players in the committee rulemaking
game can and sometimes do take advantage of these costs by proposing rules that diverge from congressional preference but fall just
short of goading Congress into affirmative action. More troubling,
the dynamics of committee rulemaking suggest that the advisory

' See Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 455, 465-69 (1993) (describing evolution of the CR process); see
also Martin H. Redish & Uma M. Amuluru, The Supreme Court, the Rules Enabling
Act, and the Politicization of the Federal Rules: Constitutional and Statutory Implications, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1303, 1308-19 (2006) (describing historical understanding of
the procedure/substance divide).
'See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
'The term "transaction-cost arbitrage" refers to the ability of well-informed players
to predict and to take advantage of other players' total costs of action. For example, a
busy Congress may find the opportunity costs of self-informing quite high for a given
proposed rules change. Well-informed inferior players may be able to arbitrage those
costs by proposing a change that diverges from Congress' fully-informed preferences
by an amount insufficient to prompt congressional self-education and affirmative action.
'See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (2006).
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committees-which occupy the lowest rung on the CR laddermay often dictate the outcome of the CR process.
This is not an abstract problem. In April 1993, inferior players in
the CR process proposed radical changes to the discovery process
in federal civil cases, including a hotly disputed "initial disclosures"
requirement."o For the first time, litigants would disclose significant
amounts of relevant information to their adversaries at the outset
of litigation, without first being asked for that material by their opponents." The general public reaction to this proposal was overwhelmingly negative: the initial disclosures requirement attracted
unprecedented public commentary, and more than 95% of those
comments opposed the proposal. 2 The House of Representatives
even passed a bill explicitly rejecting the initial disclosures requirement. 13 Even so, the initial disclosures requirement became
law on December 1, 1993.14
And in early 2005, Congress passed bankruptcy reform legislation intended to increase the costs associated with filing for bankruptcy protection and to thereby reduce the number of "abusive"
filings." When subordinate CR players generally hostile to the legislation were given the task of drafting rules to implement Congress' reforms, they proposed requirements that mitigated the costincreasing effects of the law by limiting the amount of information
many debtors were required to collect and then disclose to the
court. 6 Despite public protests from highly influential members of
Congress, the more debtor-friendly rules went into effect on December 1, 2005 without change." Neither the initial disclosures requirement nor the bankruptcy reform rules have been overridden
by Congress.
Both of these high-profile disputes are consistent with transaction-cost arbitrage by the relevant rules advisory committees and
other inferior players in the CR game.

10

12

See infra Section III.A.
See id.
See id.

" See id.
See id.
"See infra Section III.B.
6 See id.
" See id.
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The CR process is generally understudied and undertheorized,
and the handful of scholars who have addressed committee rulemaking typically have not examined the potentially conflicting incentives facing the various players in any comprehensive way." But
there is substantial value in this exercise.
Formal analysis of the intuitions that inform our understanding
of committee rulemaking is independently valuable, and the analysis in this Article goes well beyond highlighting the common-sense
intuition that delegation carries agency risks. The model presents a
more complete and more precise picture of the complicated dynamics of committee rulemaking. The process has many moving
parts, and formal modeling demonstrates that those parts can interact in surprising and often counterintuitive ways. Modeling also
allows us to form a more complete assessment of the good and the
bad in committee rulemaking, and provides important insights in
how to (and how not to) fix the problems we find. Finally, the
model presented in this Article may generate empirically testable
hypotheses for future work.
Part I will offer a brief overview of the CR process, identifying
both the procedural regimes subject to the CR norm and the nominal veto gates present in the current formulation.
Part II will recast the CR process in game theoretic terms, conceptualizing rulemaking as a dynamic interaction between the

"For a representative sampling, see, e.g., Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making
Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87
Geo. L.J. 887 (1999); Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme
Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 673 (1975); Richard L. Marcus, Of
Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 Brook. L. Rev. 761
(1993); Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 Am. U. L.
Rev. 1655 (1995); Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice,
77 Minn. L. Rev. 375 (1992) [hereinafter Mullenix, Counter-Reformation]; Linda S.
Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and Separation of Powers, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 1283 (1993) [hereinafter Mullenix, Unconstitutional
Rulemaking]; Walker, supra note 6; Jack B. Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court
Rulemaking Procedures, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 905 (1976). Among the few scholars who
have studied the issue, Professor Walker comes closest to expressing the intuitions
behind this Article's analysis. Walker specifically identifies and criticizes the significant power invested in advisory committees, see, e.g., Walker, supra note 6, at 462-63
(criticizing "vast discretion exercised by the Advisory Committee"), but fails to account properly for the incentives of other players or the ability of inferior players to
anticipate and preempt rejection by superior players. See Part II, infra.
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preferences of the five groups of players" involved in the process.
Incorporation of the players' transaction costs (including their information and opportunity costs) alters these interactions in an important way: because Congress (and to a lesser extent, other players) must expend time and resources to take action, inferior players
may be able to arbitrage these costs to obtain results inconsistent
with the preferences superior actors would express in a world
without transaction costs. And different initial distributions of
preferences and transaction costs can yield dramatically different
outcomes.
The model also has surprising implications for the relative importancc of interest groups in the rulemaking process. In particular, whatever its negative democratic implications, the CR game
may mitigate the influence of interest groups relative to traditional
legislative processes.
Part III will explore the implications of the model in a real-world
context, focusing on two separate real-world examples. I first discuss the 1993 rulemaking process in connection with the adoption
of the "initial disclosures" requirement of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(a)(1). I next examine the rulemaking process attendant to the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA). In both examples the
available evidence is consistent with successful transaction-cost arbitrage by subordinate actors playing the committee rulemaking
game.
Part IV will ask whether and how the procedural rulemaking
process might be improved such that outcomes better reflect congressional preferences. The prescriptive question is a difficult one
because the efficiency and expertise advantages that justify the CR
approach are real. Given the inherent and likely insurmountable
information deficits associated with direct congressional action in
most rulemaking scenarios, it may be advisable to retain the basic
structure of the CR process, but to revise the selection rules for the
membership of rulemaking committees such that they are more re"The five institutional players in the current version of the CR game are: advisory
committees, the Standing Committee, the Judicial Conference, the Supreme Court,
and Congress. But see infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text (explaining that the
term "Congress" in this case actually denotes a potentially complex set of interactions
between the House, the Senate, and the Executive Branch).
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liably reflective of the bodies with constitutional responsibility for
setting substantive policy.
I. THE COMMITTEE RULEMAKING PROCESS
Expert committees are the primary architects of virtually all
rules of practice and procedure affecting federal courts. The committee rulemaking process as we know it dates to the procedural
revolution spearheaded by Professor Charles Clark in the 1920s
and 1930s.20 Professor Clark and other proponents of a rules-driven
approach to procedure envisioned expert rulemaking as an integral
component of their project to simplify and demystify court practice.21 The following briefly summarizes the current structure of the
committee rulemaking process in federal courts.
A. Summary of Process
Committee rulemaking is governed by the Rules Enabling Act
(REA).22 First passed in 1934 in anticipation of the adoption of the
inaugural version of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the current version of the REA expressly authorizes the Supreme Court
to prescribe rules of practice, procedure, and evidence in connection with the operation of the federal courts.' Though the Supreme
Court's discretion in prescribing rules under the REA is substantial, the rules prescribed may not "abridge, enlarge or modify any

substantive right." 24
Congress does not expect the justices of the Supreme Court to
draft and promulgate rules themselves. Rather, 28 U.S.C. § 2073
authorizes the Judicial Conference of the United States (created by
statute at 28 U.S.C. § 331) to "prescribe and publish the procedures

20
See, e.g., Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 85 Yale L.J. 914 (1976) (summarizing Clark's contributions to development of modern civil procedure).
21 See, e.g., Charles E. Clark, The Influence of Federal Procedural Reform, 13 Law
& Contemp. Probs. 144, 152-54 (1948) (extolling the success of the expert committee
rulemaking process).
2 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (2006). Unless expressly indicated otherwise, all further
references to the Rules Enabling Act refer to the version in effect at this writing.
' Id. § 2072 (2006).
24 Id. § 2072(b) (2006).
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for the consideration of proposed rules." 25 This statute authorizes,
but does not require, the Judicial Conference to appoint advisory
committees assigned to "assist the Conference by recommending
rules to be prescribed." 26 Advisory committee membership is to be
drawn from the judiciary and practicing bar.
The REA further requires that the Judicial Conference authorize the appointment of a "standing committee on rules of practice,
procedure, and evidence," whose functions are to review suggestions made by any advisory committees and to recommend new
rules and rules changes to the Judicial Conference as necessary.'
The Judicial Conference in turn recommends proposed changes to
the Supreme Court. The REA requires that every recommendation
be accompanied by (1) a proposed rule; (2) an explanatory note;
and (3) "a written report explaining the body's action."29
Once the Supreme Court has approved a proposed rule change,
28 U.S.C. § 2074 requires the Court to transmit that proposal to
Congress no later than May 1 of the year in which the rule is to become effective."o Congress then has a minimum of seven months to
25 Id. § 2073(a)(1) (2006). The Judicial Conference of the United
States consists of
the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, the chief judges of each judicial
circuit, the chief judge of the Court of International Trade, and a single district judge
from each of the judicial circuits. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2006). District judges are selected by the circuit and district judges within their circuit, and serve terms of between
three and five years. Id. Among other things, the Judicial Conference is tasked with
reviewing the business of the federal courts, including review of rules of practice and
procedure. Id. The Judicial Conference is expressly authorized to propose rules to the
Supreme Court, but as a practical matter, these proposals are nearly always vetted
through the Standing Committee and the relevant advisory committee before transmission to the Supreme Court. See http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/procedurejc.htm.
"Id. § 2073(a)(2) (2006). The Judicial Conference has to date empaneled advisory
committees in connection with rules governing Appellate Procedure, Bankruptcy,
Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence. See http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/Members List_07_2009.pdf.
27 Id. § 2073(a)(2) (2006).
BId. § 2073(b) (2006).
29
Id. § 2073(d) (2006). This requirement is one of several checks on advisory committee power enacted in 1988. See Rules Enabling Act Amendments, Pub. L. No.
100-702, § 401, 102 Stat. 4642, 4649 (1988). Though these amendments likely decreased transaction costs for superior players (especially Congress) by providing basic
information regarding proposed rules changes, they certainly did not eliminate them.
3028 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (2006). For an example of a transmittal letter from the Supreme Court to Congress, see Letters from Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. to J.
Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Dick Cheney, Presi-
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review the proposed changes, which generally become effective on
December 1 of that year unless Congress takes affirmative action
to reject the rules.31 This "negative option" approach applies to all
REA rules except rules "creating, abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary privilege," which "shall have no force or effect unless approved by Act of Congress." 32
At a rudimentary level, the CR process is linear, with each superior nexus along the line enjoying veto rights over inferior decision
modes. In practice, the CR process is often recursive at its lowest
levels; proposed rules are sometimes returned to the advisory
committee for revision or further consideration by the Standing
Committee or, less frequently, by the Judicial Conference or Supreme Court.'
As a practical matter, Congress involves itself in the CR process
only infrequently. From the inception of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in the late 1930s until 1972, the Supreme Court transmitted new rules or rules amendments to Congress fourteen times,
and Congress allowed each proposed change or amendment to become law without comment.35 Even after the infamous showdown
between the Court and Congress in connection with the adoption
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress rarely rejects rules
changes proposed by the Supreme Court as a result of the CR
process.
dent of the Senate (April 12, 2006), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Letters.Orders.pdf
(last visited Oct. 15, 2009).
331 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (2006).
2 Id. § 2074(b) (2006). This provision is a direct result of
a highly visible conflict between Congress and the Supreme Court in connection with the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1973. That conflict ultimately resulted in congressional rejection of the FRE and statutory enactment of a competing set of evidentiary rules.
See, e.g., Note, The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: Of Privileges and the Division of Rule-Making Power, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 1177, 1190-95 (1978) (describing dispute and resolution).
33 See Appendix A for a graphical depiction of the federal committee rulemaking
process.
' For an excellent and detailed description of the CR process, see McCabe, supra
note 18.
3 See id. at 1660 & n.29.
" For a list of the handful of congressional interventions in the CR process from
1973 to 1985, see H.R. Rep. No. 99-422, at 8-9 n.20 (1985). Most involved changes to
the Rules of Evidence, and some of these were clean-up from the fallout of the 1973
dispute regarding the Federal Rules of Evidence. Several of the very few changes
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B. Why Delegate?
Congress' decision to delegate rulemaking authority to the
courts under the Rules Enabling Act is likely the product of at
least two separate influences. First, as other commentators have
documented, Congress in 1934 almost certainly accepted the conventional wisdom that procedure and substance existed in almost
wholly separate spheres. Thus, in passing the REA, Congress
would have seen itself as doing nothing more than delegating pedestrian administrative responsibilities to the courts, while expressly reserving to itself all authority to make substantive policy."
Second, Congress likely delegated rulemaking authority as it did
because the CR proccss provides substantial expertise and efficiency advantages relative to nondelegation.39 Congressional delegation of authority to committees is often rational and expectedutility-maximizing even when Congress is aware, ex ante, of the
risk that committee preferences may differ from floor preferences
writ large.'
The real expertise advantages offered by delegation to committees may, in some circumstances, offset the agency costs imposed
by the system. But they do not eliminate them. In addition, the
transaction-cost arbitrage problems identified in this Article can, to
some degree, be mitigated without sacrificing those expertise advantages.4 1 The game-theoretic model of the rulemaking process
developed in Part II both demonstrates the potential problems associated with the current system and hints at possible solutions.

overruled by Congress in connection with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also
appeared to relate to the 1973 dispute (e.g., changes to civil procedure rules regarding
taking of testimony, admission of evidence, etc.), as did several of the congressional
overrides of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
37
See, e.g., Redish & Amuluru, supra note 6, at 1310-14.
38See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
39 See generally Bone, supra note 18, at 917-46.
4 See, e.g., Thomas W. Gilligan & Keith Krehbiel, Collective Decisionmaking and
Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, 3 J. L. Econ. & Org. 287 (1987) (modeling expertise advantages of congressional delegation to committees); see also Bone, supra note 18, at 917-46 (summarizin advantages of CR process over other possible forms of procedural rulemaking).
ISee infra Part IV.
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II. A GAME-THEORETIC MODEL OF COMMITTEE RULEMAKING

The rhetoric surrounding the creation, implementation, and evolution of the CR process suggests that Congress adopted the CR
model in large part to take advantage of the expertise judges, practitioners, and academics can bring to bear in designing rules of
practice and procedure.42 The negative option character of most
CR further implies that Congress was aware that it was surrendering at least some ability to enact its absolute procedural preferences. The negative option expressly allows Congress to defer to
the results of the CR process when the CR process yields results
acceptable to Congress, or when CR results at odds with Congress'
zero-transaction-cost preferences are insufficiently important to
draw congressional fire.
This approach is not accidental; Congress is busy, and Congress
is filled with policy generalists poorly suited for the painstaking
task of procedural system design. To some degree, adoption of the
negative option CR process must be interpreted as an explicit and
deliberate tradeoff between Congress' interest in obtaining procedural regimes consistent with its own preferences on one hand and
the opportunity costs associated with congressional expression of
those preferences on the other.
But at the same time, there is little evidence that Congress has
ever programmatically considered the substantive implications of
ostensibly procedural rules in the context of rulemaking system design.43 Prior scholarship has similarly left the policy implications of
the preference tradeoffs inherent in a negative option regime
largely unexplored." This Article explores those tradeoffs and the
likely preference equilibria arising out of the current CR system
using a game-theoretical lens.

42

See, e.g., Redish & Amuluru, supra note 6, at 1308-10.
For the obvious exception, involving evidentiary rules, see 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b)
(2006).
" See, e.g., Mullenix, Counter-Reformation, supra note 18, at 376-82 (lamenting alleged usurpation of judicial authority without considering potential substantive impact of ostensibly procedural rules).
3
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A. The Parametersof the Game
The CR process can be modeled as a sequential game mapping
the incentives of the five relevant players. The game introduced below analyzes the incentives of (1) the relevant advisory committee,
(2) the Standing Committee, (3) the Judicial Conference, (4) the
Supreme Court, and (5) "Congress." The structure of the game is
adapted from a similar analysis of legislative incentives developed
by William Eskridge and John Ferejohn.4 5 Eskridge and Ferejohn
map the preferences of various constitutional actors (including
members of the House, Senate, the Executive Branch, and the
Federal
Judiciary) along a single axis to predict statutory equilib46
na
ria.
This Article provides a similar analysis for CR players, mapping
their preferences and transaction costs along a preference continuum to predict rulemaking equilibria. For inferior CR players, the
Eskridge/Ferejohn point-preference approach is sufficient; the preferences of an advisory committee or the Standing Committee can
be described by a single point on a preference continuum.
It is substantially more difficult to map "congressional" preferences. In order for Congress to veto negative option rulemaking, it
must enact legislation and then present that legislation to the President. The President must then sign that legislation into law.47 in
other words, defining congressional preferences in the CR context
requires an additional game theoretical analysis of the "Article I,
Section 7 game" that drives the parties' understanding of how Article I and Article II actors would combine to generate "congressional" preferences. Moreover, there are no guarantees that Congress and the President will actually play the Article I, Section 7
game with respect to any given procedural question; the transaction costs associated with doing so may be too high. Thus, the important question with regard to Congress and the President is not

45 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80
Geo. L.J. 523 (1992).
46 See, e.g., id. at 529-32.
See, e.g., Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Amendments Act of 1975, Pub. L.
No. 94-64, 89 Stat. 370 (1975) (affirmative legislation delaying effective date of proposed rule change); 121 Cong. Rec. 27199-27200 (1975) (presidential execution of
same).
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what their collective preference is, but rather what it would be in a
world without transaction costs.
Therefore, unless otherwise noted, this Article will use the term
"congressional preferences" or the variable "C" to refer to the outcome of a complete Article I, Section 7 subgame in a world without
transaction costs. I refer to "congressional" preferences for convenience only; the "congressional" preferences reflected in the CR
game represent what Congress and the President would come up
with if they were locked in a room and forced to express their preferred outcome.'
The starting point for the game is the status quo, which prevails
in the absence of additional rulemaking. If the median committee
member of the advisory committee desires a change to the status
quo, the advisory committee will have an incentive to propose an
amendment to existing rules, assuming the advisory committee believes that its preferences ultimately will be implemented.49 If the
advisory committee had the final say on the adoption and implementation of procedural rules, this would be the end of the game.
But in the U.S. committee rulemaking system, superior actors each
have some form of veto power over the advisory committee's proposals. The final outcome of the CR game is thus dependent upon
the preferences and interactions of each of these players.
48
As Eskridge and Ferejohn note, the Article I, Section 7 game does not always
yield a change from the status quo. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 45, at 530-31.
Sometimes the preferences of Article I and Article II actors result in legislative impasse. See id. In the CR model, this "congressional" impasse is denoted by placing
"C" in the same place as the status quo on the continuum. The fact that C is collocated with the status quo, however, does not necessarily imply congressional impasse;
it can also denote genuine preference for retention of the status quo.
4 This Article adopts a traditional "median preference" model to predict policy outcomes. See generally Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy 11
(1957); Howard R. Bowen, The Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation of Economic Resources, 58 Q.J. Econ. 27, 34-36 (1943). These models employ the simplifying assumption that each actor within a group has perfect and complete information
regarding her colleagues' preferences. The intuitive appeal of such models is obvious:
the member of any democratic body whose preferences represent the body median as
to any issue exercises enormous influence over that body's action. But median preference decisionmaking is not necessary for the model to function. Rather, the inferior
players must simply have some mechanism by which a group preference can be identified. At the advisory committee level, intra-committee deference to members with
particular issue expertise may often drive group preferences. See, e.g., infra note 120
(noting that development of bankruptcy form was delegated to an internal working
group within the advisory committee).
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Positive political theory suggests a formal model for this sequential game. For purposes of constructing the model, I assume that
information is complete, in that the preferences of the players, the
structure of the game, and the rationality of the actors are all common knowledge. I also assume that the players can, by backward
induction, perfectly anticipate the future course of play. Finally,
the game assumes that no one can commit to future courses of action, and thus that each rules decision is reached on its own "merits" without logrolling.so I employ the following notation:
For any given question of procedural policy:
SQ = Existing rule (status quo), the default position if no change
is enacted
AC = Preference of the median member of the appropriate advisory committee
AC* = Indifference point beyond which advisory committee prefers status quo to amendment
C = Zero-transaction-cost preference of "Congress""
C* = Indifference point beyond which Congress will reject a
change52
SCom = Preference of the median member of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
SCom* = Point at which the Standing Committee is indifferent
between vetoing and accepting the proposed change"
'oThe introduction of logrolling-the mutual exchange of favors-complicates the
game, but does not render it meaningless; rather, preference-trading of this sort takes
place in the shadow of the CR game and is thus informed by it.
" Because Congress can only veto even negative option rulemaking through the enactment and presentment of positive legislation, "C" is itself a product of a separate
Article I, Section 7 game that ultimately incorporates the preferences of the President, veto-proof congressional majorities, and, occasionally, Article III courts engaged in judicial review. Though a deep examination of the phenomenon is beyond
the scope of this Article, the CR process can become quite complicated when certain
conditions obtain in connection with this Article I, Section 7 game. See Eskridge &
Ferejohn, supra note 45, passim.
52 When necessary, the terms C*R and C*L denote congressional indifference points
to the right or to the left of the zero-transaction-cost preference of Congress "C" respectively. In general, only the congressional indifference point lying to the side opposite the status quo will be relevant; in such cases, the term C* is used.
"Functionally, the transaction-cost-adjusted preferences of the Standing Committee and, to a slightly lesser extent, the transaction-cost-adjusted preferences of the Judicial Conference and even the Supreme Court, are unlikely to lie far from their abso-
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JC = Preference of the median member of the Judicial Conference
JC* = Point at which the Judicial Conference is indifferent between vetoing and accepting the proposed change
SCt= Preference of the median member of the Supreme Court
SCt* = Point at which the Supreme Court is indifferent between
vetoing and accepting the proposed change
x = Rules policy resulting from the game.
In determining whether any change will be enacted and where
rules policy will be set in this game, the critical factor is the relationship of the status quo to the other variables along the continuum.
B. The TransactionCosts of CongressionalAction
The transaction-cost-adjusted point C* is the most important
point in the economic analysis of committee rulemaking.54 The difference and distance between zero-transaction-cost congressional
preferences and the outcomes Congress will accept on transactioncost-avoidance grounds creates the opportunity for opportunistic
behavior by subordinate actors.
In this model, for any given procedural policy, point C represents the hypothetical outcome of the Article I, Section 7 game in a
world without transaction costs. In other words, "C" is where Congress and the President would end up if they were forced to conlute preferences. Given these bodies' generally lower expected opportunity costs,
lower information costs, and lower transaction costs, it is generally likely that the absolute preferences of the median member of each of these groups is an acceptable
proxy for their adjusted preferences. Nonetheless, there are scenarios in which transaction-cost arbitrage of intermediate-player preferences is possible. See, e.g., Friedenthal, supra note 18, at 677 (accusing Supreme Court of exercising insufficient supervision over CR in the 1970s).
5 Among the myriad possible permutations of preference distributions are many in
which the preferences and indifference points of intermediate actors drive the outcome. Though several such scenarios are presented for demonstration purposes, the
Article primarily focuses upon the advisory committee/Congress interaction for two
reasons. First, intermediate actors face substantially lower transaction costs than Congress. See Subsection II.E.3. Thus, their indifference points will likely lie far closer to
their absolute preferences. Second, the general principles of the model are welldemonstrated by the advisory committee/Congress dance, which has the added advantage of highlighting the tension between the CR process and society's democratic
commitments.
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sider the issue. C* in turn represents the largest departure from C
that Congress would accept without taking affirmative action." The
gap between C and C* is best understood in terms of the transaction costs imposed by the real world. Hypothetical point C assumes
these costs away, but real-world constitutional actors would have
to make substantial investments to discover and then express their
preferences.
As the model suggests, it may be possible for subordinate
players in the Committee Rulemaking game to arbitrage this transaction cost gap by proposing procedural policies that differ from
informed congressional preferences by amounts insufficient to
draw congrcssional fire. Three specific types of transaction costs
comprise the transaction cost gap: (1) traditional collective action
transaction costs associated with eliciting affirmative action out of
a large and complex institution; (2) information or search costs associated with Congress informing itself of the full implications of a
given rules outcome; and (3) the opportunity costs of congressional
action at the time a particular rule is proposed.
1. Collective Action Costs
It is difficult to get even a fully informed Congress to act. The
U.S. lawmaking process is, in fact, designed to have high transaction costs as a check against tyrannous majorities; the legislative
committee process, bicameral conference and approval, and presidential execution all combine to make the passage of legislation intentionally costly."
Thus, when Congress chooses to delegate responsibility to an
agent, that agent will have some ability to express its own preferences simply because it is costly to get the congressional machinery
moving. Even if each member of Congress (and the President)
knew exactly what they wanted a given procedural policy to be,
such that a congressional equilibrium preference C could be identi" It is of course possible that preference dynamics would yield the status quo rather
than any change.
' There are in fact likely to be two congressional indifference points for each point
C: one to the left of C and one to the right of C. Only one such point is typically in
play for any particular policy question.
" See, e.g., The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison) (explaining benefits of separation of powers).
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fied, it is possible that subordinate actors could substitute their own
preferences to at least some degree based upon the costs associated
with simply prompting Congress to move.
2. Search/Information Costs
Moreover, legislators do not necessarily know exactly what they
want any given procedural policy to be. Rather, legislators are usually rationally ignorant of both the details of procedural regimes
and of their broader policy implications. This is in many ways the
flip side of the "committee expertise" coin; it would take an enormous amount of work for Congress to even figure out where "C" is
for many procedural issues.
We would not expect Congress to expend significant resources
to investigate the implications of any given procedural rule unless
that rule obviously and significantly differed from Congress' intuitive sense of the right. For example, consider a potential amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(1)(B) changing the
allotted time for responding to a summary judgment motion. If
subordinate players proposed to change the deadline from the current 21 days to 20 days, it is far less likely that Congress would selfeducate than if the proposed change were from 21 days to 5. Information costs are a very real component of the legislative process.
Subordinate actors in the CR process do not face the same information deficits. Rather, these subordinate players are often far
better informed as to the implications of a particular outcome by
dint of their professions and their developed expertise. Article III
judges and experienced practitioners are likely to have a good
sense of the ways in which a proposed rule or standard will work,
and of how it will interact with other rules and standards, even if
Congress does not.' Information costs are a critical component of
the transaction costs associated with active congressional involve' Subordinate players may be able to arbitrage congressional information costs
even further by proposing standards in lieu of rules. Standards do have real-life advantages over rules in certain situations; in particular, they allow greater flexibility in
particularly difficult or fact-intensive contexts. Nevertheless, the net effects of a standard may be more difficult for Congress to ferret out than a rule, since subordinate
actors will be relatively better informed. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557 (1992).
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ment in committee rulemaking, and the information cost differential between Congress and inferior CR players often drives the result.
3. Opportunity Costs
Congressional transaction costs in the rulemaking context are
dynamic rather than static. That is, the absolute costs associated
with congressional self-education and action may be constant for
any given policy issue, but we must also consider those costs relative to other congressional priorities. When Congress is not particularly busy, we would expect to see an increase in its willingness to
monitor and supervise the rulemaking process. By contrast, when
Congress is overwhelmed with work, we would expect to see relatively less supervision of subordinate players in the CR game.
The opportunity cost of congressional intervention is a critical
component of the CR game calculus. Using our model's terminology, all else being equal, higher opportunity costs at a specific point
in time will tend to increase the distance between C and C* relative
to lower opportunity cost periods.
And congressional opportunity costs are relevant even if we expect interest groups to attempt to fill congressional information
gaps (however imperfectly or one-sidedly)." Interest groups that
would benefit or suffer disproportionately from a given procedural
outcome of course have an incentive to provide information to legislators in an attempt to overcome the information cost problem
and shift the game in their favor. But the provision of that information does not occur in a vacuum.
Rather, lobbyists for a given procedural outcome are competing
for an enormously valuable resource-legislative attention-with
myriad other parties. One cannot therefore simply dismiss the information cost component of C* by claiming that interest groups
will incur the necessary costs on behalf of Congress. Even for procedural changes where interest group formation and activity is
likely, there is no guarantee that anyone on Capitol Hill will have
time to listen.

" See Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy 60-69 (1994).
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C. The Positive Option/Negative Option Distinction
Before setting out the model, it is worth explaining why the two
competing approaches to committee rulemaking-positive-option
rulemaking and negative-option rulemaking-are really just variants of the same game. First consider likely policy outcomes in a
mostly counterfactual "positive-option" world' in which Congress
must affirmatively approve any rules change through formal legislation." In a positive-option world, transaction-cost-adjusted preferences are arguably less relevant than in a negative-option context; Congress will act, after all, either affirmatively or through its
very inaction.62 But even in positive-option rulemaking, transaction
costs matter to some degree, because each participant in the process must decide whether a given proposal is worth accepting despite potential divergence from that participant's absolute preferences. It is certainly possible to imagine Congress accepting and
affirmatively approving a proposal some distance away from its
own preferences if (a) that proposal nonetheless represents an improvement upon the status quo and (b) it would be too costly for
Congress either to incur the soft-but-real costs associated with rejection-by-inaction or to legislate its absolute preferences directly.
In other words, even positive-option rulemaking will have a
transaction cost component, and thus a separate point C* that
represents the farthest subordinate players can diverge from absolute congressional preference C without drawing a congressional
veto instead of affirmative congressional approval.
That said, it is likely that the relative distance between C and C*
will be lower in positive-option rulemaking than in negative-option
rulemaking. In order for subordinate players to arbitrage transaction costs successfully in a positive-option regime, they must chart a
careful course between the Scylla of congressional inaction and the
6 As discussed above, rulemaking regarding evidentiary privileges is positiveoption; see 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (2006). But the remainder of the CR process is negative-option.
61All intermediate levels of the CR process are effectively positive-option for all
types of rulemaking because the Standing Committee, the Judicial Conference, and
the Supreme Court must each approve a given change for it to be presented to Congress; the label "positive-option" in this context refers to the congressional veto gate
only.
62 Congressional inaction in such cases is functionally equivalent to affirmative rejection of the proposed policy.

2010

Close Enough for Government Work

89

Charybdis of full congressional consideration of the issue. The former will yield the status quo; the latter will produce "C."" Since
Congress will have to overcome its collective action challenges to a
great degree even simply to approve of a positive-option proposal,
the transaction costs inferior players can arbitrage in a positiveoption world are effectively limited to the information acquisition
costs facing Congress if it chooses to self-educate.
But the differences in incentives between the two forms of CR
are differences of degree only, not kind. In negative-option rulemaking, the results of the subordinate CR process become law
unless Congress affirmatively objects by a certain date. Despite this
difference in execution, the relevant variables are the same as in
positive-option CR: we care about Congress' absolute preferences,
its transaction-cost-adjusted indifference points, and those same
data points for the other players in the game.
In negative-option CR, it is possible that the distance between C
and C* will be greater than in the positive-option alternative.
Transaction costs associated with mustering up the energy to reject
a given proposal affirmatively are likely to be higher than in the
positive-option context, and the externalities associated with congressional inaction are likely to be lower (in the positive-option
context, congressional failure to act preserves a status quo that is
prima facie unacceptable, at least from the perspective of subordinate players). Thus, it is possible that subordinate players might be
able to arbitrage transaction cost differences more successfully in a
negative-option world than in its positive-option counterpart; there
is simply more space to arbitrage. But the form of the game is the
same.
D. Modeling Rulemaking
Consider the following four cases involving different preference
distributions among the relevant actors in a CR game.
Case 1: AC < SCom, SCt, JC, C < SQ.
I start with a case in which the status quo is objectionable to all
relevant actors in the same direction. All players in the CR game
would like to see the policy shift to the left of the status quo. In this
' This assumes that there exists an Article I, Section 7 game value of C divergent
from the SQ.
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case, the advisory committee's preference is more radical than any
other actor's, and Congress' preference is closest to the status quo.
Figure 1 maps the relevant preferences:

I

I

I

I

I

AC

SCt

Cc

C

SQ

SCom

Jc

Figure 1: All prefer change to left of status quo: advisory committee and intermediates left of Congress

There will be a rules change in this situation, since every relevant
actor prefers an outcome to the left of the status quo and all subordinate players' preferences lie to the left of C. But it is congressional indifference point C*, not the hypothetical zero-transactioncost congressional preference point C that drives the outcome. C*
represents the transaction-cost-adjusted congressional indifference
point for any given policy change. That is, C* represents the policy
equilibrium beyond which Congress would be willing to reject the
CR proposal, either through inaction in the positive option context,
or affirmatively in the more common negative-option environment.
The equilibrium in this simple case is likely to be at or near C*.
The intuition surrounding the placement of C* is important.
Congress will always incur transaction costs in connection with implementation of its own absolute preferences. Less obviously, Congress will also incur transaction costs in the positive-option context
if it fails to act. By contrast, a fully developed CR proposal offers
Congress an extremely low-cost alternative to independent legislation: enactment-by-inaction for negative-option CR or verbatim
approval of the CR output in the positive-option context.' Fully in-

6 Further permutations of the analysis in this Article might consider a hybrid or
continuum-driven indifference model in which congressional "tweaking" of CR outputs would be possible depending upon the transaction costs of any given "tweak."
Thus, one could envision a scenario in which Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 was
revised through the CR process to require, among other more substantive changes, a
waiting period of only one week between filing of a summary judgment motion and
the hearing date. Congressional approval or acquiescence may be the order of the day
as to the more substantive changes, which would require substantial effort to alter,
but Congress may well step in to preserve the existing ten-day waiting period because
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ternalized transaction costs will always give Congress an incentive
to accept changes that diverge from absolute congressional preference as long as they (1) change the status quo in Congress' preferred direction and (2) do not go too far. C* denotes "too far" in
the model.
If the advisory committee tries to set an equilibrium to the left of
C* in Case 1, Congress will reject that equilibrium. Though a move
to the left of SQ is initially a move in the right direction from Congress' perspective, any move beyond C* goes too far. There is,
however, an "arbitrage range" in between points C and C* where
Congress will not act, and within which subordinate players can
nudge the outcome even farther in their desired direction."
Given that the advisory committee and all intermediate actors
would prefer an outcome to the left of C*, this particular version of
the CR game will yield an equilibrium at or very near C*, just short
of a proposal that would produce congressional rejection either by
inaction or by affirmative legislation.'
Of course, opportunities for arbitrage only exist if the actors'
relevant preferences lie on the correct side of the status quo. Consider Case 2:
Case 2:AC< SCom, JC, SCt< SQ <C.
This case presents a scenario in which congressional preference
lies to the right of the status quo, while all other actors' preferences
lie to the left. In Figure 2A, the congressional transaction-costadjusted indifference point also lies to the right of the status quo:

transaction costs associated with that particular tweak are low. Nonetheless, a hybrid
model of CR is beyond the scope of this Article.
65 It is possible that Congress could persuade lower rungs on the CR ladder that C
and C* are identical; at the very least, in the positive option world we would expect to
see relatively little space between the two points relative to the negative option world.
In this analysis, the location of C* fully internalizes all costs of congressional rejection. Even if Congress "wants what it wants," however, there is some deviation from
its preferences that Congress will find too de minimis to reject or correct. C* represents that deviation. The same analysis obtains for each of the intermediate actors.
6 All else being equal, the distance between C and C* will increase whenever Congress faces higher opportunity costs relative to its baseline level of activity. See infra
Subsection II.B.3. In addition, we would expect to see greater distance between C and
C* in negative-option rulemaking than in positive-option rulemaking. See infra Section II.C.
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Figure 2A, Congress and congressional indifference point right of SQ; all others left.

Here, the answer is obvious. No equilibrium acceptable to the
advisory committee and intermediate players would also be acceptable to Congress. Congress would reject every proposal generated by the CR process, since none of them would be, from Congress' perspective, an improvement over the status quo. Put
another way, inferior players cannot arbitrage congressional transaction costs without making things worse from their perspective;
any change acceptable to Congress would lie right of the status
quo, in the opposite direction of the inferior players' collective
preferences.67
But what if Congress' transaction-cost-adjusted indifference
point lies to the left of the status quo? Figure 2B describes the equilibrium in that case:

I

I

x
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Ii

SCt

I 'I

CO SQ

-

I

C

I

SCom
iC
Figure 2B: Congress right of SQ: congressional indifference point left of SQ; all others left of SQ

Here, even though Congress nominally prefers an outcome to
the right of SQ, it is willing to accept a slight move to the left without acting; inferior players would arbitrage the transaction cost gap
to move the equilibrium closer to their own preferences.

6 This preference distribution does not necessarily imply affirmative congressional
action. In the absence of a proposed amendment from subordinate players, it is still
quite possible that Congress will not be sufficiently interested in the issue to act.
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Unity of transaction-cost-adjusted directional preference is not a
sufficient condition for a policy change; it is a necessary condition.
Cases 3 and 4 demonstrate this reality:
Case 3: AC < C < intermediateplayerpreferences < SQ.
In this case, as in Case 1, all actors' preferences lie to the left of
the status quo. But in Case 3, congressional preference lies to the
left of all but the Advisory Committee's preference. Figure 3 maps
these preferences:

I

AC

I

C

I

SCt

II
SQ

SCom
JC
Figure 3: Absolule preferences only- all players left of SQ; Congress left of intermediate players

Here there may also be a rules change, but in order to ascertain
whether a change will occur and the likely equilibrium point, we
must consider several additional variables. Because congressional
preference lies to the left of the preferences of the Standing Committee, Judicial Conference, and Supreme Court, any proposed
rule change under a CR process with mandatory congressional action must account for both the indifference points of the intermediate actors and for C* as well.
An advisory committee facing the preference map described in
Figure 3 would have to consider a variety of factors in proposing a
new policy. Because each intermediate actor enjoys veto power
over advisory committee proposals, the advisory committee would
have to set the new policy enough to the right of AC such that the
intermediate actors would not prefer the status quo to the proposed change. Thus the advisory committee's proposal would have
to be inside each intermediate actor's indifference point beyond
which that intermediate actor would prefer to leave things as they
lie.
The advisory committee must simultaneously consider congressional desires as well. If the advisory committee's proposal can
thread the needle between the intermediate actors' indifference
points vis-A-vis the status quo and Congress' transaction-costadjusted indifference point C*, a new equilibrium can be reached.
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Figure 3A describes such a scenario, with the equilibrium lying
somewhere between the relevant indifference points:"

III

x
AC

I

C SCt*
SCome

JC*

I
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SCt

II

SQ
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JC

Figure 3A- All players left of status quo; new equilibrium possible

In Figure 3A, the relevant preferences suggest equilibrium at or
near the intermediate actors' indifference points; anything to the
right of this gives up ground that neither the advisory committee
nor Congress would be willing to surrender.'
But even when all actors' preferences lie to the same side of the
status quo, the expanded version of Case 3 implies that neither
committee rulemaking nor successful arbitrage is inevitable. Consider a variation on Figure 3A where C*R lies to the left of any or
all of the intermediate players' indifference points as in Figure 3B
below:

' Recall that for any value of C, there are two values of C*, one in either direction
along the continuum. For a variety of reasons, only one such value is generally relevant to any given problem; thus the Article typically uses the generic term C* to refer
to the relevant indifference point. The terms C*R and C*L denote the rightward and
leftward congressional indifference points on occasions where it is useful to acknowlede that the acceptable outcome range extends in both directions from C.
A preference distribution of this sort would be relatively uncommon in real life,
limited perhaps to circumstances involving particularly complex rulemaking issues.
When the inferior players' preferences all lie to the same side of the status quo as congressional preference, one would expect C*R (the point farthest to the right of "C"
Congress would be willing to accept in lieu of affirmative congressional action) to lie
close to SQ, since any move to the left would be an improvement from Congress' perspective. The closer C*R is to C, the more likely Congress is to act independently from
the CR process. The location of C*L is irrelevant in this case because it will by definition lie outside the intermediate actors' transaction-cost-adjusted indifference points.
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Figure 3B: All players left of status quo: no new equilibrium possible

In this case, the advisory committee will not propose a change. If
it were to propose any policy to the left of the intermediate players' indifference points, those intermediate players would simply
veto the proposal in favor of the status quo. If the advisory committee were to propose anything to the right of the intermediate
players' indifference points, that proposal would lie well above the
transaction-cost-adjusted policy indifference threshold represented
by C*. Congress would simply reject the results of such committee
rulemaking. Anticipating this, the advisory committee would take
no action.o
A final hypothetical preference distribution illuminates a scenario in which a new equilibrium is also dependent upon the advisory committee's indifference point. Consider Case 4:
Case 4: C<AC<SCom, JC, SCt<SQ.
This case presents a slight twist on Case 3, in that here Congress
would ultimately prefer a more radical departure from the status
quo than any of the other actors. Figure 4 describes these preferences:

'oThere is yet another layer to this and other situations in which the end result deviates from absolute congressional preference: whether Congress will incur the further
transaction costs associated with affirmative legislation of its procedural preferences.
A full discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this Article, but the mere existence of a status quo divergent from C for any given issue generally implies that the
answer is "no" for that particular issue. Moreover, even if SQ and C are identical, it
may still be possible for inferior players to arbitrage congressional transaction costs.
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I
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I
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JC
Figure 4: Absolute preferences only; all players left of SQ: Congress farthest left

Here, as in Case 3, the outcome is ultimately dependent upon
indifference points. But this time, the relevant advisory committee
indifference point also comes into play along with the indifference
points associated with Congress and intermediate actors. The advisory committee again must thread a needle in order to move the
rule from the status quo. Specifically, the advisory committee can
only propose a change (1) that the intermediate actors would prefer to the status quo, (2) without crossing the threshold beyond
which Congress will exercise its positive option veto, and (3) that
remains within the advisory committee's own indifference curve
relative to the status quo.
Figure 4A provides an example of a preference set in which a
change is possible:
x
C
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Figure 4A' New equilibrium possible

In this case, the advisory committee can successfully propose a
new equilibrium because there is space between the intermediate
indifference points beyond which intermediate actors would prefer
the status quo, the congressional indifference point C* that would
prompt a congressional veto," and the advisory committee's own
Note that there are likely to be two points C* on either side of C in this case, but
that only the point C* to the right of C comes into play. That is, Congress would also
be willing to go some distance to the left of its absolute preferences, without vetoing
the change, but since no actor's preferences are to the left of Congress', the leftward
indifference point is irrelevant. Here, the rightward point C* in effect represents the
7'
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indifference point beyond which it prefers the status quo to a move
to the left. The equilibrium point will fall just within C* because
the advisory committee does not want to move any farther left beyond its own median member's preferences than necessary. But a
rules change will not always result from this basket of absolute
preferences, as Figure 4B demonstrates:
X
C
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SCt*
SCom*

JC*

AC*

AC St
SCom

SQ

Jc

Figure 4B: No change from status quo

Here, the advisory committee will not propose a change, because
it would prefer the status quo to any policy change that Congress
would accept. That is, any proposal to the right of AC* will prompt
a congressional veto, and any point to the left of AC* is inferior to
the status quo in the advisory committee's view. Thus, this basket
of preferences yields no change from the CR process.
There are myriad additional possible permutations and combinations of preference patterns we could analyze using this method.
Variations in the relative positions of absolute preferences and indifference points abound, and matters could be complicated exponentially by disaggregating the intermediate actors' preferences
and indifference points from one another. Nonetheless, the sample
cases above provide a useful sketch of the game theoretical implications of the CR process under a variety of different initial preference distributions.
E. Implications of the Model
The implications of the model are significant, if arguably normatively ambiguous. The model identifies a significant risk associated
with congressional delegation of rulemaking authority to inferior
actors: that those inferior actors will arbitrage congressional trans-

point beyond which Congress believes that the CR process isn't doing enough to
move the rule in the right direction.
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action costs to obtain outcomes divergent from congressional preference. But the same dynamic also suggests a possible advantage of
the CR process as currently constituted: to the extent we are concerned that congressional transaction costs are also arbitraged by
interest groups, the outcome of the committee rulemaking game
may be no less intrinsically valid than congressional legislation. Finally, the model suggests that the intermediate players, while important, are not central to the analysis. Committee rulemaking is in
some ways a two-player game between the advisory committees
and Congress.
1. The Risks of Delegation
The normative and prescriptive implications of the game theoretic model described above depend on several factors. First, it
matters substantially whether real-world distances between C and
C* are sufficiently large to raise concerns that well-informed subordinate players are arbitraging these differences into policy outcomes that differ substantially from what would be the Article I,
Section 7 game outcome in a world without transaction costs. Part
III of this Article presents two real-world CR stories consistent
with the model that display troubling gaps between congressional
preference and the final outcome. In both examples, subordinate
players arguably obtained policy outcomes substantially at odds
with congressional desires by arbitraging congressional transaction
costs.
Committee expertise is a double-edged sword. Expert committees enjoy real and generally desirable advantages over nonexperts with respect to designing workable procedural systems.
They are acutely aware of the challenges facing the judicial system,
and are likely to have a far better sense of how any given proposed
solution will work in practice. But experts also know the system's
pressure points. The same expertise that can help build a better
mousetrap can also be used to tip the balance in favor of the experts' systemic substantive preferences.
Thus, one significant implication of the model is that the composition of subordinate institutions (the advisory committees, the
Standing Committee, the Judicial Conference, and the Supreme
Court) matters. In particular, to the extent we value rules that accurately reflect the preferences of constitutional legislative actors,
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the "fit" between subordinate actors and Article I, Section 7 players is important. But the ways in which subordinate actors are currently selected suggest that a good "fit" may be difficult to obtain.
In essence, the entirety of the subordinate player framework comes
directly or indirectly from the judicial branch. Article III judges
control every veto gate in the CR game until play moves to Congress. Their control is direct in the case of the Supreme Court and
the Judicial Conference, and the Chief Justice, acting as the chair
of the Judicial Conference, appoints members of the Standing
Committee and the various advisory committees (many of whom
are Article III judges themselves).72 Given the real expertise advantages of the CR process as currently constituted, it may be inadvisable to change the underlying structure of the CR process. But it
may be both feasible and desirable to change the manner in which
at least some committees are selected.73
Left alone, the current Article III-dominated rulemaking apparatus is subject to at least two potential risks. First, the federal judiciary as a whole largely reflects the dead hands of past presidential
administrations. The Framers clearly intended this dead hand effect as part of the original constitutional compromise.7 4 It is less
clear, however, whether they intended the judiciary to have such
power in the rulemaking process, especially to the extent rulemaking can be used to defy or dilute the otherwise constitutional substantive policy preferences of the legislative and executive
branches.
The Chief Justice's appointment power exacerbates this risk.
Though the memberships of the Judicial Conference and Supreme
Court will almost certainly reflect different presidential administrations and thus different underlying ideologies, the same is not necessarily true for the Standing Committee or the Advisory Committees. Members of both are appointed by the Chief Justice, and can

' See Dawn M. Chutkow, The Chief Justice's Appointment Power 3 (Apr. 14, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=990167); see also Peter
Graham Fish, The Politics of Federal Judicial Administration 274 (1973); Russell
Wheeler, A New Judge's Introduction to Federal Judicial Administration, Fed. Jud.
Center 7 (2003).
" See infra Part IV.
See U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (stating that there shall be life tenure for Supreme
Court Justices and inferior federal judges on good behavior).
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be expected to share the Chief Justice's preferences to some degree."
Second, Article III domination of CR presents some risk that the
evil alter ego of institutional expertise-self-dealing-may rear its
ugly head. There is a sort of "foxes guarding the henhouse" aspect
to the current system. That is, judges face at least some incentive to
pursue rules that balance efficiency and justice in ways contrary to
congressional intent, but attractive to the judiciary for other rea-

sons.76
2. An UnderappreciatedBenefit?
In addition to the risks associated with the current CR process, it
may also offer at least one benefit: it may make the committee
rulemaking process less susceptible to interest group pressure than
its legislative cousin. That is not to say that interest groups will be
absent from the CR process. Far from it-the list of entities testifying at any advisory committee hearing demonstrates that interest
groups are present in force when CR infringes upon their interests.
But by giving substantial power to subordinate actors, the CR
game to some degree insulates the CR process from the most brazen and effective forms of interest group influence. Subordinate
CR game players do not need campaign contributions. Furthermore, these subordinate actors, from the Supreme Court on down
to the advisory committees, are far better informed than their congressional counterparts. A member of Congress may and perhaps
should be rationally ignorant of many details of our procedural systems. This information deficit creates an opportunity for interest
groups. By contrast, the typical member of a rulemaking committee, the Judicial Conference, or the Supreme Court is at worst wellacquainted with and at best a genuine expert in the subject matter
over which they have authority. Interest groups will talk to the advisory committees, but the advisory committees have less need to
listen.
Thus, if we are at all worried that the efforts of interest groups
can affect the location of "C" on our continuum, then perhaps the
" See Chutkow, supra note 72, at 4, 6.
7
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same
Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 1 (1993).
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implications of the CR game are somewhat more ambiguous. It
may be that in some cases the "arbitrage" possible is not really arbitrage at all, but the CR game equilibrium represents an outcome
somewhat closer to "untainted" congressional preferences than
could be obtained if Congress were making the rules itself.
3. The Last Shall Be First?
To a certain degree, intermediate players in the CR game get
short shrift throughout this Article. I map these actors' preferences
to demonstrate the effect that various preference distributions
might have on the equilibrium, but they rarely take center stage in
discussion of the model or its implications.
This is as it should be. In many ways, the CR game is probably
best conceptualized as a two-player game played between the relevant advisory committee and Congress, with the intermediate players (the Supreme Court, the Judicial Conference, and the Standing
Committee) exercising influence primarily on the margins. More
accurately, because the distance between intermediate actors' absolute preferences and transaction-cost-adjusted preferences is
likely to be relatively small, there often will be little or no opportunity for the advisory committee to arbitrage those costs into a
game-theoretically interesting outcome.
The distance between absolute and transaction-cost-adjusted
preferences is likely to be smaller for intermediate actors than for
Congress because intermediate actors' collective action costs, information costs, and opportunity costs are all likely to be lower
than Congress' for virtually every imaginable procedural rules
change. The intermediate bodies are smaller than Congress, more
focused than Congress, and have significantly more expertise in the
relevant subject matter than does Congress. Each intermediate actor has an obligation to consider all proposed rules and must affirmatively move them forward in order for them to reach the next
stage. Moreover, each intermediate actor can send an objectionable rule back to an earlier stage at very low cost, especially compared to the costs Congress incurs to reject a proposal in a negative-option environment.
Thus, while each intermediate actor may still be willing to accept
small deviations from their absolute preferences in the name of
transaction-cost-minimization, the arbitrage opportunity will be
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quite small. In general, we should expect advisory committees to
treat absolute intermediate preferences as both given and outcome-determinative, leading them to propose only rules that account for those absolute preferences."
4. InstitutionalParalysis
Finally, the model suggests that institutional paralysis is likely to
be a defining characteristic of the committee rulemaking process.
There are myriad preference distributions-including many in
which all of the relevant actors would prefer change in the same direction-thatwill nonetheless result in retention of the status quo.
Institutional paralysis will primarily be a function of inferior
player preferences. There are multiple possible choke points during the initial stages of the process, and disagreement between and
among any of the inferior players can yield a stalemate." The normative implications of this feature of the CR process are ambiguous, but the model highlights just how perfectly the stars must align
in order for rules changes to occur.
III. THE COMMITTEE RULEMAKING GAME INTHE REAL WORLD
In assessing the utility of the CR model described above, the
most important issue may be whether the incentives identified interact in real life as predicted in the model. The hidden nature of
much of the rulemaking process makes concrete examples hard to
find. Two separate rulemaking controversies, however-one in the
area of civil procedure and one in the context of bankruptcy law-

" In decrying the excessive influence of the advisory committees (a conclusion
largely supported by this Article's analysis), Professor Walker seems to assume that
the advisory committee acts without regard for the preferences of superior players.
See Walker, supra note 6, at 465-69 (conflating minimal Supreme Court review and
rejection of proposed rules with "nearly absolute" discretion on the part of advisory
committees). But Supreme Court inaction is equally plausibly explained by the model:
subordinate players accurately anticipate and preempt superior players' preferences.
8 In negative-option rulemaking, the presence of a full-blown Article I, Section 7
game atop the CR process actually reduces the likelihood of paralysis, at least relative
to positive-option rulemaking. For negative-option CR, anticipated congressional impasse actually increases arbitrage opportunities. For positive-option CR, the same Article I, Section 7 game preferences would create an additional hurdle to rulemaking
reform.
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are consistent with skillful play of the committee rulemaking game
by inferior players, to Congress' detriment.
A. The Initial Disclosures Controversy
Broad discovery was one of the chief innovations of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. By the early 1990s, however, many observers believed that the discovery process in civil cases was in serious need of reform. In response to this perceived crisis, subordinate CR players in 1993 proposed radical changes to the discovery
system in place for federal civil cases. The outcome of this rulemaking bears the earmarks of a successful attempt to play the
committee rulemaking game.
1. Framing the Dispute
Throughout the 1980s, judges, practitioners, and other commentators sounded the alarm: discovery in civil cases was out of control." Critics of the discovery system decried the gamesmanship of
the parties and the evasiveness of discovery responses."o They also
lamented the extraordinary expense of discovery in many cases."
By the early 1990s, subordinate players in the CR process were
evaluating possible responses to this perceived discovery crisis. In
August, 1991, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules gave notice
and solicited public comment on a radical solution: a revised Rule
26(a)(1) that would have required all parties to civil litigation to
disclose to their adversaries various information that "bears significantly on any claim or defense."' As envisioned by the Advisory
79

See, e.g., Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: How Bad Are the Problems?, 67
A.B.A.J. 450 (1981); Arthur J. Goldberg & Frank Daily, Stop the Discovery Game, 72
A.B.A.J. 38 (1986).
See, e.g., Brazil, supra note 79, at 451.
8 Nat'l
Conference of State Trial Judges, American Bar Ass'n, Discovery
Guidelines for State Courts (2001), available at http://www.abanet.org/jd/ncstj/
pdflGuidelinesWithCommentary.pdf.
' Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the United
States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence 14-15, 137 F.R.D. 53, 87-88 (1991); see
also Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 103rd Cong. 272-73 (1993) (comments of American Legislative Exchange
Council et al.) [hereinafter Initial Disclosures Hearing].
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Committee, this disclosure requirement would exist exclusive of
any formal discovery request from a party's adversary; rather, the
disclosing party would have an affirmative obligation to disclose
the information at the outset of the case.
At public hearings in November of 1991 and February of 1992,
76 witnesses testified against the proposed rule; in addition, the
Advisory Committee received over 200 written statements of opposition to the proposal." At the close of the February 1992 public
hearing, the Advisory Committee voted to withdraw the proposal
from the package of proposed amendments it was preparing for
submission to the Standing Committee.
Shortly before the Advisory Committee's April 1992 meeting,
committee members circulated a memorandum calling for the reexamination of the initial disclosures concept.85 At the April 1992
meeting, the committee approved a substantially revised version of
the rule that replaced the "likely to bear significantly" standard
with a standard requiring disclosure only of material "relevant to
disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings."8 6 In addition, the revised proposed disclosure rule eliminated a system of
mandatory sanctions that many commentators criticized.
The Advisory Committee forwarded these revised proposed
amendments on to the Standing Committee without suggesting
that additional notice or comment was necessary. The Standing
Committee then forwarded the proposed revisions to the Judicial
Conference without seeking additional public comment, concluding that because the revised amendments were either "technical
and clarifying in nature, or represent less of a modification of the
current Rule 26 than had been proposed in the published draft," a
new notice and comment period was unnecessary.'
On April 22, 1993, the Supreme Court transmitted revised proposed initial disclosures rules to Congress in the form of a signifi-

"8Initial Disclosures Hearing, supra note 82, at 273.
' Id.
" Id.
6 Ann Pelham, Panel Flips, OKs Discovery Reform, Legal Times, Apr. 20, 1992, at
6, reprintedin Initial Hearings Disclosure, supra note 82, at 311.
* See H.R. Doc. No. 74-89, at 124 (1995).
SId. at 126.
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cantly revised Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26.' Under the proposed Rule 26(a)(1), civil litigants would for the first time be required to disclose a variety of information to their opponents at the
outset of litigation.' According to its supporters, the "initial disclosures" requirement would mitigate discovery costs, discovery
games, and ultimately discovery abuse by requiring parties to exchange the most important information at the beginning of a case."
2. Congressionaland Public Criticism
Even in its revised form, the proposed rule elicited a firestorm of
criticism from the bar and from members of Congress.' The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules recorded over one hundred formal
comments on the revised proposed initial disclosures rule, of which
95% were again negative.93 These critics claimed that the initial disclosures standard was too vague, that it would spawn additional satellite litigation and discovery disputes, and that it would prove
unworkable in practice under the notice pleading system as litigants struggled to interpret their disclosure obligations in light of
their duties to clients.'
On June 16, 1993, the House Judiciary Committee held hearings
on several proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure." Though several witnesses (primarily individual members of subordinate rulemaking committees) testified in favor of
the changes,' other witnesses criticized the proposed amendments. 7
"See Communication from the Chief Justice of the United States Transmitting
Amendments to the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure and Forms, Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
2072 (Apr. 22, 1993), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 403 (1993). The change to rule 26
was one of approximately twenty proposed changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure transmitted on that date. Most were wholly noncontroversial.
' See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) (requiring initial disclosure of names and addresses of
likely witnesses, documents supporting the party's claims or defenses, damages computations, and relevant insurance agreements).
" See Initial Disclosures Hearing, supra note 82, at 30-51 (testimony of Judge William W. Schwarzer, Director, Federal Judicial Center).
Id. at passim.
Id. at 303.
*Id.
9 See generally id.
See generally id. at 5-61.
See generally id. at 63-160.
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3. CongressionalAction (and Inaction)
On November 3, 1993, the full House of Representatives briefly
debated and then passed a bill rejecting the proposed initial disclosures requirement. 98 H.R. 2814 generally adopted the majority of
amended rules proposed by the Supreme Court, but would have
enacted specific amendments to rule 26 eliminating the initial disclosures requirement entirely."
But H.R. 2814 never became law. On November 4, 1993, the day
after H.R. 2814 passed in the House, then-Senator Joe Biden
sought and received unanimous consent that the bill be placed on
the Senate calendar for consideration. The bill never made it out of
committee. Almost four months after the Civil Rules Amendments
Act of 1993 was introduced in the Senate, Alabama Senator Howell Heflin referred to the Senate's failed effort to pass a companion
bill. During debate on proposed statutory revisions to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 11, Heflin stated, "There was some effort to
make some changes to rule 26(a)(1), which deals with discovery,
and rule 30(b)(2) relating to the taking of depositions. The House
did make some changes in those areas, but it was not passed here
in the Senate.""
Because Congress failed to reject the initial disclosures rule proposed by the Supreme Court, the initial disclosures rule resulting
from the CR process became law on December 1, 1993.1o Initial
disclosures are still a part of the discovery landscape today."
4. The Game Theory of the InitialDisclosures Controversy
The outcome of the initial disclosures debate provides additional
evidence that the game theoretical approach adopted in this Article is usefully descriptive of real-world situations. Though it is im" See Civil Rules Amendments Act of 1993, H.R. 2814, 103rd Cong. (1993).
same set of proposed amendments featured another controversial proposal,

'9 The

Rule 30(b)(2), that would allow audio or audiovisual recording of depositions in lieu

of stenographic recording at the deposing party's option. H.R. 2814 also would have
rejected this change, substituting instead a rule that created a presumption of stenographic recording that could be overcome only by written agreement of the parties or
by court order. Id. at 3. The dispute over Rule 30 also could be characterized as an
example of the problematic implications of the committee rulemaking game.
o See 140 Cong. Rec. S2860 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1994) (statement of Sen. Heflin).
' See 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2006).
'" See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1).
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possible to identify the precise preferences of all actors in that
drama with any specificity, several different preference distributions are consistent with the outcome. For example, given House
passage of a bill that essentially maintained the status quo, and
given the tenor of the vast majority of public comment on the proposed amendment, it is reasonable to assume that Congress' absolute preference lay at or near the status quo under which there
would be no disclosure requirement.
In addition, because three Supreme Court Justices took the unusual step of dissenting from the Court's decision to forward the
rule to Congress," it is at least plausible that the median member
preference of the Supreme Court lay somewhat closer to the status
quo than the preferences of the other inferior players." Recall,
however, that the Supreme Court's transaction costs in connection
with rejection of a rule proposed by inferior players are very low
relative to those faced by Congress. Even though the Supreme
Court's preferences may have been closer to the status quo than
other inferior actors' preferences, it is unlikely that the transaction
cost gap was significant for the Court.
In the absence of additional evidence, it is impossible to make
more than an educated guess about the precise distribution of preferences among the other inferior players, but we do know two
things. First, an initial proposal by the advisory committee garnered universally horrible reviews, generating unprecedented levels of negative public comment."' Second, the CR process ultimately yielded a somewhat less ambitious revised proposal

'o A copy of Justice Scalia's dissent, which was joined in relevant part by Justices
Thomas and Souter, can be found in the congressional hearing materials. See Initial
Disclosures Hearing, supra note 82, at 211-15.
'" This does not have to be the case, of course. Justices Scalia et al. could have been
outliers, and the Supreme Court's median member preference might have been consistent with the preferences of other inferior players. But it is at least possible given
the evidence that the Supreme Court's inaction was transaction-cost-driven.
"The model adopted in this Article assumes perfect and complete information is
available to all parties. Had the Advisory Committee possessed perfect and complete
information regarding the preferences of superior actors, it would not have issued its
initial proposal. In the real world, we would expect inferior actors to be relatively
well-informed regarding the preferences of superior players, but we would not expect
them to have perfect and complete information. The Advisory Committee's misstep
in this case does demonstrate, however, that players do invest in the acquisition of information that moves them closer to the model's ideal over time.
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forwarded from the Standing Committee to the Judicial Conference to the Supreme Court to Congress. Given that the Standing
Committee did submit the initial proposal for notice and comment,
it is reasonable to assume that the Standing Committee's preferences matched the advisory committee's preferences.' 6 Thus, it is
possible that the preference distribution was as follows:
X
SQ
SC
C
AC
C
SCom
SCt
JC
Figure 5: Initial disclosures final proposaL Disclosure required of materials "the disclosing party may use to
support its claims or defenses." New equilibrium possible

Note that x lies some distance from the status quo, and thus from
absolute congressional preference. This is broadly consistent with
the real-world dispute. Given the House's passage of H.R. 2814
and the near-miss result in the Senate, it is plausible that the Advisory Committee arbitraged congressional transaction costs to obtain a result closer to its own absolute preferences.'o
In Figure 5, the intermediate players do not constrain the Advisory Committee in any meaningful way with respect to the final
" The Judicial Conference preference in this situation remains unknown; I place it
with the Advisory Committee's and Standing Committee's both for convenience and
because there is no evidence to the contrary. I also assume for illustrative purposes
that the Supreme Court's absolute preferences lie to the right of the Advisory Committee's initial proposal, and that the Supreme Court faces essentially no transaction
costs in connection with vetoing an unacceptable proposal (that is, SCt=SCt*). We of
course do not know what the median member of the Supreme Court thought of the
first initial disclosures proposal because the Advisory Committee revised the proposal
before it reached the Supreme Court veto gate. But the fact that the revised proposal
garnered three dissents provides some support for a median preference to the right of
the advisory committee preference.
" Recall that congressional transaction costs can also involve congressional impasse; a split of opinion between the Senate and the House moves C* even further
away from C. In some cases, there simply is no "C" because the Article I, Section 7
game will not yield a change. In those cases, it is appropriate to locate "C" at point
SQ. Even if Congress and the President would be unable to express a preference for
any particular point "C", they would nonetheless be able to act to reject a rule that
deviates too much from the status quo. Thus, while predicted congressional impasse
does expand inferior players' transaction-cost arbitrage opportunities, it does not give
subordinate players carte blanche to impose their own preferences.
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equilibrium. Rather, the Advisory Committee's final proposal
takes account only of congressional preferences. But intermediate
players' preferences did play a role in forcing the Advisory Committee to revise its initial proposal."0
One can generate numerous additional preference distributions
consistent with the information available in the public record regarding the initial disclosures dispute. For example, the advisory
committee's absolute preferences may have been even more extreme than those reflected in its initial proposal, but its ability to
express those preferences may have been tempered by the less
radical preferences of the Standing Committee or Judicial Conference. Regardless, the implication of the 1993 initial disclosures dispute is clear: inferior actors' skillful play of the committee rulemaking game plausibly explains the outcome.
The final equilibrium in the initial disclosures case is particularly
interesting given the composition of the inferior committees and
their incentives. Article III judges effectively control the lower
rungs of the CR process, and it is no secret that judges dislike discovery disputes. While much of their opposition to discovery battles is likely grounded in a genuine and accurate belief that such
disputes are inefficient and wasteful, it is also plausible that committee members were at least in part motivated by the understandable desire to reduce the annoyances and frustrations attendant
with presiding over discovery fights." It is another question en-

'"Another possible explanation for the revision is that the Advisory Committee,
Standing Committee, Judicial Conference, and Supreme Court (less its dissenters)
were all on the same page, but they misconstrued the location of C and/or C*. In this
scenario, the notice-and-comment period for the initial proposal provides the Advisory Committee with new information regarding public preferences that it then stratefically incorporates into its revised proposal.
'See Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery As Abuse, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 635, 636-41
(1989); see also Posner, supra note 76. Notably, the final proposed rule drew three
dissents from the Supreme Court, the sole layer of the inferior CR process whose
members are not routinely exposed to discovery disputes. Recall that the Judicial
Conference is composed of almost half District Court trial judges. See 28 U.S.C. § 331
(2006). The Standing Committee currently has thirteen voting members, of which
only five (three Circuit Court of Appeals Judges, one state supreme court justice, and
one academic) are not routinely involved in litigation as either counselor or judge.
See U.S. Courts, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (2009),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/CommitteeMembership-Lists/STRoster_2009.pdf.
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tirely whether the initial disclosures requirement actually reflected
democratic preferences.
B. The Bankruptcy Means Test Dispute
Congress recently substantially revised the Bankruptcy Code to
limit purportedly "abusive" filings. This controversial statute instituted a "means test" designed to limit access to discharge of debts.
Debtors who genuinely lacked the ability to repay could seek discharge, but those who could repay would be diverted into different
types of bankruptcy filings.
The statute provides a list of considerations relevant to determining whether a debtor has "passed" the means test, but the statute is not self-executing." 0 Instead, Congress chose to delegate
much of the implementation of its new scheme to a committee
rulemaking apparatus generally hostile to the aims of the reform
legislation. The rulemaking associated with the new requirements
arguably provides an additional example of successful transactioncost arbitrage by inferior CR players.
1. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer ProtectionAct
of2005
In 2005, a Republican Congress and President enacted the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
(BAPCPA)."' The centerpiece of this long-debated and controversial bankruptcy reform legislation was a "means test" designed to
increase the transaction costs associated with filing for bankruptcy,
and to limit allegedly unworthy debtors' access to discharge of
debts under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.12 The BAPCPA
means test requirement was intended to funnel debtors with more
significant resources into "Chapter 11" or "Chapter 13" bankruptcies instead; those proceedings favor reorganization of debts and
the development of payment plans over full discharge of debts.

"oSee 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A) (2006) (describing calculations and listing monthly
expenses the court is authorized to consider in performing means test).
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23.
11 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)
(2006) (setting forth presumption of abuse income thresholds).
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The stated goal of BAPCPA is to eliminate, or at least limit,
"abusive" Chapter 7 filings by debtors whose resources suggest at
least some ability to repay their debts. 3 Among other things, the
statute specifically requires debtors seeking Chapter 7 protection
to provide a "schedule of current income and current expenditures"H4 that includes a statement of the "debtor's current monthly
income, and the calculations that determine whether a presumption" of abuse arises."
But as the text of Section 707(b)(2)(C) suggests, not all debtors
are subject to the means test presumptions. In particular, no presumption of abuse attaches if the filer's household income is below
the median income in the debtor's home state.116 If the filer's income exceeds the state median, then a full-blown means test must
be performed."'
2 .Rulemaking on the Means Test Disclosures
Under BAPCPA's statutory framework, a debtor filing for bankruptcy protection is apparently required to detail her current
monthly income and more: "As part of the schedule of current income and expenditures required under section 521, the debtor shall
include a statement of the debtor's current monthly income, and
the calculations that determine whether a presumption arises under subparagraph (A)(i), that show how each such amount is calculated.""'

113 See, e.g., Remarks on Signing the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, 1 Pub. Papers 639, 639-40 (April 20, 2005) (highlighting alleged "abuse" of old bankruptcy regime and noting that under new bill, "Americans
who have the ability to pay will be required to pay back at least a portion of their
debts").
See 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B) (2006).
See id. § 707(b)(2)(C) (2006).
"'See id. § 707(b)(7) (2006).
" If the debtor's income is above the state median, abuse is presumed if the
debtor's aggregate current monthly income over five years, net of certain statutorily
allowed expenses, is more than (i) $10,950; or (ii) 25% of the debtor's nonpriority unsecured debt, as long as that amount is at least $6,575. See U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy
Basics, Chapter 7, http://www.uscourts.gov/bankruptcycourts/bankruptcybasics/
chapter7.html (last visited Jul. 30, 2009). The original amounts set in the statutory text
at the time of its enactment were $10,000 and $6000. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A) (2006).
These amounts are subject to an automatic inflation adjustment. Id. § 104(b) (2006).
"' 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(C) (2006); see also id. § 521 (2006).
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But the bankruptcy statute does not explain how this information is to be collected. Instead, Congress expressly delegated development of the procedural details to the CR process by amending the Rules Enabling Act to require the promulgation of a
statute-compliant form."'
Shortly after BAPCPA became law, the Advisory Committee on
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure established a "means test working
group" tasked with crafting the new form and rules. 120 In August
2005, the Judicial Conference approved an interim set of rules and
forms for transmission to the courts in advance of BAPCPA's October 15, 2005 effective date. 12 1 Among other provisions, this set of
materials included Form B22A,122 which requires the disclosures
that courts may use to determine a debtor's eligibility for Chapter 7
liquidation and discharge.
One aspect of Form B22A proved surprisingly controversial in a
way that may demonstrate the descriptive power of this Article's
game-theoretical analysis of committee rulemaking. Specifically,
the form did not require each and every debtor to detail both her
income and expenses. Rather, it employed a "flow chart" style of
reporting that required disclosure of expenses and "presumption of
abuse" calculations if and only if the debtor's income exceeded the
median income in the debtor's home state for the debtor's given
household size. 23 If the debtor's income was less than the statemedian threshold, then the form required no further disclosure. 124

" See 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (2006) ("The bankruptcy rules promulgated under this section shall prescribe a form for the statement required under section 707(b)(2)(C) of
title 11 and may provide general rules on the content of such statement.").
20
' See Minutes of Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules, Meeting of August 35, 2005, at 7-8, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/BKO8-2005-min.pdf (last visited
Jul. 31, 2009).
12

Id. at 8.

See Form B22A, Chapter 7 Statement of Current Monthly Income and MeansTest Calculation, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/BKForms 08
Official/B_022A_1208.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2009).
123 Id. at Part III, Items 13-15.
12 Id. Debtors whose incomes are less than the state median are directed to skip
Parts IV, V, VI, and VII of the form, and to complete only Part VIII of the remainder
of the form, which is nothing more than a verification section.
12
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3. A CongressionalControversy?
Form B22A drew criticism from several prominent members of
Congress. On March 13, 2006, Republican Senators Chuck
Grassley (chief architect and primary Senate sponsor of BAPCPA)
and Jeff Sessions (another important sponsor of the legislation)
sent a letter to the Supreme Court objecting to Form B22A as proposed by the Advisory Committee and implemented by the Judicial Conference. 125 From the Senators' perspective, BAPCPA's exemption of below-median-income debtors from the presumption of
abuse did not imply an exemption from income and expense reporting requirements: "[BAPCPA] does not exempt any debtor
from the information filing requirement. Congress specifically
chose not to create such an exemption. The Senate Judiciary
Committee, on which we serve, specifically rejected such an exemption; the Judicial Conference should not create an exemption
already rejected by Congress." 126
The Grassley/Sessions interpretation of the statute is not illogical; in fact, the plain language of the statute arguably supports their
claim because the statute apparently requires all Chapter 7 debtors, without exception, to perform "the calculations that determine
whether a presumption arises under subparagraph (A)(i)." 127 If
Senators Grassley and Sessions carried the day with their interpretation, every debtor filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy would be required to submit detailed monthly expense information in addition
to their monthly income information.128 In addition, every debtor
would perform "presumption of abuse" calculations and would be
15Letter
from Chuck Grassley and Jeff Sessions, U.S. Senators, to John Roberts,
Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court (Mar. 13, 2006), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/BK%20Interim%2OComments%202005/05-BR033.pdf. Unlike actual rules, bankruptcy forms need only pass muster at the Judicial
Conference level to have the force of law. See Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure
9009, available at http://www.prb.uscourts.gov/Rule900.html. Nonetheless, Congress
of course retains the authority to supersede a form by way of affirmative legislation.
126 Letter from Chuck Grassley and Jeff Sessions, U.S. Senators, to John Roberts,
Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court (Mar. 13, 2006).
12711 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(C) (2006).
28
1 See Form B22A, Chapter 7 Statement of Current Monthly Income and MeansTest Calculation, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/BKForms_08
Official/B_022A_1208.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2009) at Parts IV, V, and VII. The
"presumption of abuse" calculations in Part VI of Form B22A cannot be performed
without the expense information disclosed in the other Parts of the form.
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required to certify that a presumption of abuse either did or did
not arise under the statute. 129
4. Normative Implications of Expense Disclosure Requirements
The Grassley/Sessions interpretation of the statute's means testing requirement is more politically conservative (or at least more
"anti-debtor") than the Advisory Committee's interpretation in at
least two ways: (1) the Grassley/Sessions interpretation would further raise debtor transaction costs in connection with filing for
bankruptcy protection; it would take time and money to assemble
the requisite information, and the additional cost of assembling expense information could deter below-median-income debtors from
filing on the margins; (2) under the Grassley/Sessions interpretation it is possible that a below-median-income debtor statutorily
exempted from the presumption by virtue of sections 707(b)(6) and
(7) would nonetheless be required to check the box entitled "The
presumption [of abuse] arises."o
Consider, for example, a debtor whose income is just barely below the state median. If her monthly expenses are also relatively
low, it is possible that her net aggregate monthly income over the
next five years (adjusted for allowable expenses) would exceed
$10,000."l That is, one can imagine a debtor who earns belowmedian income but would nonetheless have in excess of $166.67
available each month with which to pay down her debts. But for
the median-income exemption of section 707(b)(7), that debtor's
Chapter 7 filing would be presumed abusive, because she would be
seeking discharge of debts despite having some real ability to repay.132
By statute, however, that debtor could never be subject to a motion to dismiss or convert her Chapter 7 filing to a reorganization
proceeding solely on the basis of the presumption of abuse; under
BAPCPA, no party has the right to challenge a filing on the basis
of the presumption alone if the debtor's income is below her state's
median.'3 In fact, if a debtor's income is below the state median,
129

See id.

3

See id.

"' See supra note 117.

At least, this would be "abusive" according to the statute.
See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(7) (2006).
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only the judge, U.S. trustee, or bankruptcy administrator can move
to dismiss or file a motion to convert the filing on "abuse" grounds
of any sort." Moreover, in such a case, the judge, U.S. trustee, or
administrator would be required to demonstrate abuse under the
"bad faith" or "totality of the circumstances" requirements of section 707(b)(3);'15 they could not rely on the presumption created
under section 707(b)(2), nor could they take advantage of the burden-shifting that presumption generates.136
Recall that Senators Grassley and Sessions interpreted the law
to require disclosure by all Chapter 7 debtors of (1) monthly income; (2) presumption of abuse calculations; and (3) by extension,
the monthly expense data necessary to perform those calculations.
Thus, even with the below-median-income "safe harbor," the
Grassley/Sessions interpretation of BAPCPA's disclosure requirements is "anti-debtor" relative to the form proposed by the Advisory Committee.
If a below-median-income debtor is required to submit expense
information and to perform presumption of abuse calculations, and
if those calculations suggest an ability to pay notwithstanding her
low-income status, those disclosures have at the very least lowered
transaction costs for a judge, U.S. trustee, or bankruptcy administrator interested in ferreting out additional "abuse" of the system.
By flagging "the presumption arises," the debtor has signaled to
those parties that her case may be worthy of additional scrutiny. In
the absence of such disclosures, search costs for the judge, U.S.
trustee, or administrator would remain relatively high, and the likelihood that they would invest substantial resources to sniff out purportedly abusive filings among below-median-income debtors

would be correspondingly low.137

'mSee id. § 707(b)(6) (2006).

'Id. § 707(b)(3) (2006).
See, e.g., id. § 707(b)(2)(B) (2006) (establishing rebuttal burdens). If a debtor's
income is above the state median and that debtor passes the means test, the presumption of abuse applies, and any party in interest can challenge the filing. Id. § 707(b)(1)
(2006).
11 In addition, it is possible that the Grassley/Sessions interpretation would yield
subtler pressures in the negotiation of the liquidation itself; various parties in interest
might bring more pressure to bear on the debtor to, for example, reaffirm certain
debts if it appeared that the debtor had some real ability to repay.
136
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5. The Game Theory of the Bankruptcy Means Test Dispute
Notwithstanding Senator Grassley's and Senator Sessions' objections to the initial Form B22A, none of the subordinate actors in
the CR process acted to change the form as requested. More important, neither did Congress: the current Form B22A retains flowchart-style organization and does not require debtors exempt from
presumption of abuse proceedings under 11 U.S.C. §707(b)(7) to
complete the "Deductions from Income" (that is, expenses) portions of the form or to perform the "determination of §707(b)(2)
presumption" calculations in Part VI."
One might tell several stories to explain this result. Perhaps
Senators Grassley and Sessions were outliers whose preferred outcome lay to the right of Congress' as a whole. Perhaps their own
opinions changed because of lobbying after the fact by the Financial Services Roundtable to tighten the noose even further on potentially undeserving Chapter 7 debtors. But given the prominent
roles these Senators played in obtaining passage of BAPCPA,1' it
is at least plausible that the Grassley/Sessions interpretation represented something close to the congressional median.
This contention is bolstered somewhat by the text of the statute
itself, which appears to require the disclosure of presumption of
abuse calculations without exception." Thus, it is plausible that the
final CR outcome embodied in Form B22A represents an equilibrium point to the left of Congress' preferred outcome as to the
means test requirement.
Of equal importance is the fact that bankruptcy experts and especially bankruptcy judges generally opposed most of BAPCPA's
provisions.141 Because the bankruptcy rules advisory committee
membership was drawn from this general population, it is not a
138 See Form B22A, Chapter 7 Statement of Current Monthly Income and MeansTest Calculation, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/BKForms_08
Official/B_022A_1208.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2009).
..Senator Grassley chaired the subcommittee that drafted the bill and is widely regarded as the chief Senate architect of the legislation. Senator Sessions was also on
the subcommittee. Both Senators are Republicans, and the Republican Party controlled Congress at the time.
140 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(C) ("[T]he debtor shall include . .. the calculations that
determine whether a presumption arises .... ) (emphasis added).
141 See, e.g., 151 Cong. Rec. H1971, at H1984 (2005) (letter opposing BAPCPA
signed by 110 bankruptcy law professors from both sides of the political spectrum).
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stretch to imagine that the advisory committee was similarly hostile
to BAPCPA, a perception that was widely shared by other bankruptcy professionals.
Or, rendered graphically, it is possible that the preference set for
means test disclosure requirements resembled the following:

i

I I

SQ SCom

x
CS

C

I

AC JC
igure 6: BAPCPA example. AC prefers SQ (no means test expense disclosure): Congress prefers all debtors
isclose all expenses: Congress transaction-cost-indifferent to disclosure by only above-median-income debtors

In Figure 6, the advisory committee, Standing Committee, and
Judicial Conference all prefer to preserve the status quo, which
would not require means-testing of debtors at all.'42 Congress' zerotransaction-cost preference lies far to the right, and would require
full monthly expense disclosure by all Chapter 7 filers. But the advisory committee did not have to propose "C" as the equilibrium
because Congress' transaction-cost-adjusted indifference point lay
substantially to the left of its zero-transaction-cost preference.
Thus, the advisory committee could propose an equilibrium exempting sub-median-income debtors from expense disclosure requirements, knowing that Congress would not expend the resources necessary to "correct" the result.
C. Dynamic Rulemaking and Opportunity Costs
Looking back, it is not possible to say with any certainty whether
inferior players timed their rulemaking in either case to coincide
with high-opportunity-cost periods in Congress.'43 Congress, to
some degree, anticipated the general risk by mandating a sevenmonth waiting period before negative-option rules become law.'"

142 Because the change was to a bankruptcy form rather than a full-blown rule, Supreme Court approval was not required, nor was formal presentment to Congress.
Thus, the Supreme Court's preferences are not reflected on the preference map.
' For an explanation of opportunity costs, see supra Subsection II.B.3.
'4 See 28 U.S.C. § 2074.

118

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 96:69

Moreover, the Form B22A dispute arose out of a congressional directive that started the rulemaking machinery in motion.
And yet an opportunity cost story is consistent with the adoption
of the initial disclosures requirement. Throughout the summer and
fall of 1993, Federal legislators on both sides of the aisle were consumed with a raging debate on health care reform."' President
Clinton, the first Democrat to hold the office in twelve years, made
health care reform the centerpiece of his initial legislative agenda.
By the fall of 1993, the health care debate consumed huge chunks
of congressional resources, as legislators dug in for a bitter fight.
It is not possible to get into the heads of then-Chief Justice
Rehnquist or the other inferior players. We do not know whether
the final position taken in the proposed amendment of Rule 26 was
more radical than it otherwise would have been because inferior
actors anticipated a distracted Congress. But it is at least possible.
Inferior players were undoubtedly aware of the change in their
presidential administration, and were aware of the fact that President Clinton had both ambitious plans and control of both houses
of Congress. If nothing else, the spring of 1993 wasn't a particularly
bad time to propose a controversial rules change in a negativeoption system.
Even if inferior players did time the proposed initial disclosures
requirement to take advantage of Congress' preoccupation with
President Clinton's ambitious legislative agenda, this did not guarantee their success. The proposal still came within a hairsbreadth
of failing. But it is at least plausible that the remarkably full congressional agenda during 1993 moved C* even further from C, giving inferior players additional room to arbitrage congressional
transaction costs.
IV. PRESCRIPTIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL

The prescriptive implications of the model are at first glance
ambiguous for two reasons. First, one might argue that partial insulation from interest groups is worth the distributive losses associated with the imperfect agency of inferior players. Second, the arbitrage risks demonstrated by the model may to some degree be
"'For a timeline of relevant events, see http://www.pbs.org/newshour/forum/may96/
background/health debate-page2.html (last visited July 23, 2009).
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counterbalanced by the expertise advantages conferred by the current structure of the rulemaking process.
But there is reason to believe that the selection process for inferior committee membership (especially for the Standing Committee and advisory committees) is more likely to yield committees for
whom transaction-cost-arbitrage risks outweigh expertise benefits.
Moreover, if Congress reserved to itself the authority to select advisory committee membership from among the same pool of participants the Chief Justice currently taps for service, it could substantially mitigate arbitrage risk without dramatically increasing
interest group risk or losing the expertise advantages of the CR
structure.
A. Is There a Problem?
Whether the model developed in this Article has any significant
prescriptive implications is a difficult question. The model does
suggest that there are sometimes disconnects between democratic/republican rulemaking preferences 46 and the outcomes of the
CR process. And rules often have systemic substantive consequences; we should care about procedural system design for that
reason alone.
To the extent we look to traditional democratic/republican theory to supply our preferences, the model is thus deeply troubling.147
At the same time, committee rulemaking enjoys substantial advantages over other potential forms of procedural system design in the
form of expertise advantages and insulation from interest group
risk.1" Any prescriptive solution to the arbitrage risks identified by
" Or, more accurately, what those preferences would be under conditions of perfect
and complete information.
14 See, e.g., Redish & Amuluru, supra note 6, at 1319-27 (questioning constitutionalit of Rules Enabling Act on substantive impact grounds).
' See generally Bone, supra note 18, at 896; see also Gilligan & Krehbiel, supra
note 40 (modeling congressional delegation of power to committees and finding the
delegation rational when expertise advantages offset agency costs). There is substantial literature exploring the proper role of courts and Congress in rulemaking. See
generally Friedenthal, supra note 18; Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking, supra
note 18; Redish & Amuluru, supra note 6; Walker, supra note 6; Weinstein, supra
note 18. 1 will not rehearse those arguments here except to note my general agreement with the "delegation theory" proposed by Professor Weinstein. See Weinstein,
supra note 18, at 906. In Weinstein's view, the majority of rulemaking authority derives from legislative delegation of authority. Id. at 927. As discussed below, however,
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the model must not come at a net loss once those benefits are included in the calculus. Taking each in turn:
1. The Committee Rulemaking Process May Mitigate Interest Group
Risk
Congress is far more subject to interest group pressure than the
other components of the CR system for at least two reasons. First,
Congress is too busy-it must remain rationally ignorant or at least
under-informed regarding judicial procedures and their broader
implications. For better or worse, Congress relies upon third parties for information, especially as to more esoteric or technical matters.'49 Third parties will fill the information vacuum, but they will
fill it with information supportive of their own interests.
Second, Congress faces reelection incentives that provide interest groups with potential levers that simply are not present as to
most of the individuals involved in the lower levels of the CR process. The judges, professors, and private individuals that make up
the various rulemaking committees are not collecting campaign
contributions, and are not beholden to contributors in the same
way members of Congress might be.
In fact, depending on one's level of skepticism regarding the republican reliability of Congress, one might go even further: perhaps the relative insulation of the CR process from interest group
pressure suggests that "transaction-cost arbitrage" by CR actors is
a reasonable price to pay to prevent interest groups' attempts to
perform similar arbitrage at the congressional level.' If the point
"C" on our preference maps is informed by interest group activity,
I do not subscribe to Weinstein's proposed solution, which would replace the Supreme Court with the Judicial Conference as the primary rulemaking body. Id. at
938-43. If (notwithstanding the indisputably substantive character and impact of
much procedural rulemaking) one rejects the validity or value of democratic input,
then the prescriptive implications of this Article's analysis would be radically different. For some, the opportunity to arbitrage congressional transaction costs may be an
asset rather than a drawback in the current rulemaking system.
149 See Paul J. Stancil, Assessing Interest Groups: A Playing Field Approach, 29
Cardozo L. Rev. 1273 (2008).
"This is not to say that interest groups are uninvolved in the CR process. Interest
groups actively lobby advisory committees and Congress in favor of their preferred
outcomes. Rather, the point is that direct congressional rulemaking would be relatively more susceptible to interest group influence than the CR process as currently
constituted.
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and especially if we have reason to believe that Congress' conversations with interest groups will be one-sided,m' then perhaps the
outcome of the CR process, pursued by committee members acting
in good faith at multiple subordinate levels, is closer to the unadulterated "C" that would be obtained in the presence of full information and the absence of self-serving interest group activity.
At the very least, any attempt to mitigate the risks identified by
the model must account for the possible advantages conferred by
inferior players' relative insulation from interest group pressures.
2. The Committee Rulemaking Process and the Expertise/Agency
Risk Conundrum
Even if we could somehow insulate Congress from interest
group pressure entirely, it would nonetheless still be true that Congress is particularly ill-suited for the painstaking task of procedural
system design. Its attention is horribly divided, and it lacks institutional expertise necessary to ensure that its amalgamation of procedural outcome preferences can be expressed in a workable
whole.
In fact, Congress' one prior large-scale attempt to craft procedural rules itself-its legislation of Federal Rules of Evidence in
the 1970s-required several rounds of committee rulemaking and
additional legislative "fixes" just to get all the moving parts working together.m' Whatever its other flaws, the committee rulemaking
process does put procedural system design in the hands of committees with the ability and incentive to invest heavily in expertise. It
is difficult to ascertain the net advantages and disadvantages of an
expert-driven process. But it is certainly plausible that the advantages associated with letting subject-matter experts design complex
procedural systems might sometimes outweigh any concomitant
self-interest risks.
Professors Gilligan and Krehbiel have formalized the intuition
that the expertise advantages inherent in congressional delegation
of authority to committees can more than offset the agency risks

"' That is, that there is no equal and opposite interest group in play in a given context. See generally Stancil, supra note 149.
152 See H.R. Rep. No. 99-422, at 8-9 n.20 (1985).
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associated with such delegation.'" Gilligan and Krehbiel focus on
congressional legislation and the relationship between the houses
of Congress, their standing committees and floor amendment procedures. They ultimately conclude that it is often in Congress' interest to delegate real authority to committees by adopting restrictive amendment procedures limiting congressional ability to
second-guess its committees, because the social gains from the
committees' subsequent investment in expertise will offset the
agency costs associated with the committees' enactment of their
own preferences.
Simplifying only a little, Gilligan and Krehbiel find that if a given
committee's views are "moderate" in relation to Congress' ("moderate" in this case being defined as some maximum deviation between the committee's ideal outcome and the floor's ideal outcome),"' it is always preferable to adopt restrictive amendment
rules. They further show that public policy may be served by restrictive amendment rules even for more "extreme" committees
whose preferences further diverge from the floor's preferences,
provided that the cost of specialization is high enough that the
committee will invest in information only if it knows that Congress'
hands are more or less tied.' In the Gilligan and Krehbiel model,
nondelegation (in the form of unrestrictive amendment rules) is
preferable only for "very extreme" committees whose preferences
diverge significantly from the floor's preferences.'
Gilligan and Krehbiel's model of committee work suggests that,
at least in the legislative context, the costs of self-dealing will frequently be overcome by the benefits of letting experts craft policy.
But there are a number of important differences between the
floor/standing committee relationships Gilligan and Krehbiel
model and the relationships involved in the committee rulemaking
game. First, Congress' pre-commitment in the CR context is substantially more general and more final than in the standing committee/floor context. As Gilligan and Krehbiel document, in the
legislative context, Congress enacts "restrictive" amendment rules
See Gilligan & Krehbiel, supra note 40, passim.
See id. at 324-25 for a formal discussion of the way in which the authors segment
committee types in relation to preference divergence from the floor.
1' Id.
6 Id. at 325.
"
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in a variety of ways and retains substantial case-by-case flexibility
to handle individual pieces of legislation differently.' Decisions
regarding the restrictiveness of amendment and debate procedures
are often made by "special orders" specific to a given bill.'
By contrast, the committee rulemaking process is a creature of
statute, with all the relative permanence and inflexibility that status
implies. No matter how potentially "substantive" a proposed rules
amendment may be and no matter how divergent the subsidiary
players' preferences from those of Congress, committee rulemaking on virtually every issue is effectively subject to "restrictive"
procedures under the Gilligan and Krehbiel taxonomy.159 Though
this rather extreme pre-commitment strategy may well encourage
maximum committee investment in expertise, it is strikingly different from the flexible approach Congress uses when considering
more obviously substantive legislation. As a result, leaving evidentiary privilege rules to one side, it could be argued that Congress
has decided, definitively and universally, that the benefits of restrictive procedures outweigh the costs as to all procedural rules
changes. The wisdom of such a categorical decision depends in
large part upon the expected "preference fit" between Congress
and inferior CR committees.
If CR committees are more likely to be "moderate" in the Gilligan and Krehbiel sense of the term," then perhaps the expertise
advantages associated with CR in its current form outweigh the
transaction-cost arbitrage risks. But if CR committees trend toward
the "very extreme," then change may be in order, especially given
the rather elaborate hand-tying to which Congress has subjected
itself by way of the Rules Enabling Act.
Unfortunately, inferior players in the CR process are systemically more likely to be "extreme" or "very extreme" rather than
"moderate" relative to Congress. Gilligan and Krehbiel study in' See generally id. at 291-98 (detailing nineteenth-century development of various
restrictive practices and exceptions such as recognition rules, party leadership precedents, suspension rules, and special orders). Suspension votes are particularly interesting, because they usually come only after the committee has reported a bill out to the
floor.
" See id. at 295-97.
."Evidentiary privilege rules are the exception. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (2006).
"oOr perhaps even merely "extreme" given the substantial expertise differential inherent in issues of procedural system design.
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ternal congressional committees. By definition, these committees
are composed of members of Congress and their staffers. They are
thus subject to a number of constraining influences. Members of
Congress interact with one another regularly, both professionally
and socially. They are subject to discipline by party leadership if
they go too far afield. And most Members of Congress' legislative
interests and desires extend well beyond the work of their own
committees. Congressional committee members thus are arguably
constrained to a substantial extent by their external legislative
agendas and the knowledge that excessive defection from floor
preferences in committee will likely limit their success elsewhere.
Finally, committees are controlled by the majority party; the risk
that committee preference will be substantially misaligned with
floor preference is therefore somewhat mitigated.16 '
The CR process offers few assurances of faithful agency by comparison. The selection of CR committee members is driven exclusively by the Chief Justice and other judicial actors, who themselves comprise a plurality of all procedural standing committees
and are the exclusive members of the Judicial Conference and Supreme Court nodes in the CR process. Article III judges enjoy lifetime tenure on good behavior, and even the "civilian" members of
subordinate committees are generally private persons without
strong social or professional connections encouraging conformity
to congressional preference.
As important, because inferior committee membership is determined by the Chief Justice, there is a potential "transitive dead
hand" problem; committees will routinely be selected by Chief Justices appointed by departed presidential administrations. When
procedural rules have substantive consequences, this ideological
disconnect is troubling.
In sum, there is essentially no connection between Congress and
the committees to which it has delegated rulemaking authority.
Thus, while we might expect the various inferior CR players to be
6' Some political science commentators have claimed that committees attract ideological outliers. See Keith Krehbiel, Are Congressional Committees Composed of
Preference Outliers?, 84 Am. Pol. Sci. R. 149, 159 (1990) (refuting the assertion).
Even if the claim were true, majority party control of committees suggests that any
committee deviation from floor preference will usually stop short of adopting minority ideology. The same cannot be said for committee rulemaking.
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"moderate" in the more general sense of the word, there is little
reason to believe that inferior CR players will be "moderate" in
Gilligan and Krehbiel's sense; that is, that their preferences will lie
close to Congress'. In a world where ostensibly procedural rules
have substantive consequences, this disconnect is of significant concern.
B. Moving the Median: CongressionalAppointment of Advisory
Committees
One possible approach to the CR game problem would leave the
essential structure of the CR process intact, and would instead focus upon "moving the median" to be more responsive to the democratic/republican process. In particular, greater congressional
involvement in the selection of advisory committee members could
help shift the median preferences of the most important committees so that they are more immediately and directly responsive to
overarching political preferences.
For example, if Congress were to select the members of each advisory committee, those committees would be more attuned to current congressional desires, and at least somewhat less subject to the
legacy administration problems occasioned by the current system.'62
It would no doubt be preferable in such a world to delineate more
concretely the criteria for advisory committee membership (for example, a statutory mandate for x% Article III judges, y% private
practitioners, etc.), but once in place, such a system could theoretically provide many of the benefits of the CR system while simultaneously diminishing the threat of transaction-cost arbitrage by
more closely aligning the preferences of those committees with the
preferences of Congress.
But what, precisely, would such a system look like? As is often
the case, the devil is in the details. Congressional selection of advisory committee members creates a greater risk of strategic behavior than the current model, and countervailing concerns regarding
institutional expertise and responsiveness to congressional preference present problems of their own.
162 Recall that the Rules Enabling Act authorizes the Judicial Conference to create
such committees. Moving appointment authority to Congress would require amendment of the REA.
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Specifically, once we have decided that Congress should appoint
all advisory committee members, a number of questions remain:
How many members should each advisory committee have? Who
should fill those positions and in what proportions? How long
should each member serve, and should terms be staggered?
There is, of course, no clear answer to these questions, but common sense and experience suggests a few guidelines. First, there is
no indication that the current membership numbers are causing
any problems. In addition, the advisory committees regularly subdivide into issue-specific working groups and subcommittees to
tackle their substantial workloads. Thus, it may be preferable to
leave the advisory committees more or less alone with respect to
membership numbers, though it may be necessary to codify the
status quo to avoid "committee packing" risks.
Second, while the selection process itself is suspect, the current
prominence of Article III judges on the advisory committees is not
likely problematic." While it is true that those judges may face incentives to decrease their own workloads by adopting restrictive
rules of procedure, it is likely that this systemic risk can be counterbalanced through appointment of ideologically diverse judges
without losing the special advantages obtained by appointing those
closest to the system. In addition, assuming ideological balance (or
perhaps rough ideological congruence with congressional preference) can be obtained, the dominance of judges on advisory committees provides substantial protection against undue political influence. A federal judge appointed by Congress to serve on an
advisory committee is still a federal judge, with lifetime tenure during good behavior. She will bring the preferred ideological overlap
with her, but she is less likely subject to other forms of political
pressure than other actors would be.
This is not to say that judges leave their personal ideologies at
home when they perform committee work. To the contrary, common sense and recent political science research both suggest otherwise." But the answer is not necessarily to remove judges from
" The same can be said of bankruptcy judges on the bankruptcy advisory committee.
"'See
Chutkow, supra note 72, at 12-15 (quantitative empirical analysis finding that
partisan alignment with the Chief Justice is significant in predicting appointment to
Judicial Conference committees).
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the process. Rather, the research itself suggests a response: give the
appointment power to someone else. The problem is not that
judges or other groups come to the committee table with their
ideological preferences. The problem is which judges come to the
table.
Given the real expertise advantages of the federal judiciary with
respect to a number of procedural issues vis-h-vis the general population, and given the perverse incentives to which other potential
members of rulemaking committees (especially members of Congress or congressional staffers) might be subject, it would be foolhardy to reduce the judicial role in rulemaking. But it would be
wise to choose those judges carefully, with an eye toward obtaining
committees with preferences more in line with Congress'.
Third, it is likely preferable to retain the current three-year default terms for advisory committee members, staggering those
terms in corporate board fashion such that one-third of each advisory committee turns over every year. The three-year term is probably necessary to ensure continuity, especially given the long time
horizons associated with many procedure projects. Three-year
terms will necessarily decrease committee responsiveness to current congressional preferences that can change radically every twoyear federal election cycle, but that problem can be addressed, in
part, by staggered terms; Congress will be able to move the committee median incrementally every year, and to obtain wholesale
replacement every four years.
In short, it may be advisable to keep things more or less exactly
as they are, save that Congress should appoint advisory committee
members instead of the Judicial Conference. If Congress were to
appoint the members of each advisory committee, those members
could be expected, at the very least, to match congressional ideology more closely.
C. IntermediateActor Vetoes and the Game Theory of
CongressionalAppointment
If Congress were to appoint the members of each advisory committee on a three-year, staggered-term basis, this would reduce but
not necessarily eliminate the gap between congressional preference
C and advisory committee preference AC in most cases. We would
thus expect to see better alignment of congressional and advisory
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committee preferences, and fewer attempts to arbitrage transaction
costs coming from the advisory committees.
But the structure this Article envisions leaves the intermediate
actors' veto powers intact. Those actors are, either directly or indirectly, Article III actors-the Supreme Court and Judicial Conference consist entirely of Article III judges, and the Standing Committee is appointed by the Chief Justice and itself primarily consists
of federal judges. The game theoretical implications of the structure proposed above are therefore somewhat complicated; greater
congruence between AC and C may still be insufficient to ensure
policy equilibria acceptable to Congress if the intermediate players' preferences lay elsewhere.
This problem is partially captured by Case 4 in Section II.D
above."' In that case, congressional and advisory committee preferences are both to one side of the intermediate actors' preferences. As the model indicates, the outcome there depends upon
the intermediate actors' indifference points; if there is significant
spread between absolute intermediate preferences and intermediate indifference points, the advisory committee may be able to effect a change in the desired direction (at least out to the intermediate indifference points). By contrast, if, as we often expect,'66 there
is little distance between absolute intermediate actor preferences
and their related indifference points, the advisory committee may
be unable to effect any change from the status quo despite its sharing Congress' belief that such a change is desirable in the abstract."' Figure 7 provides a starker depiction of the problem:
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Figure 7: Congress & AC agree; intermediate actors prefer SQ: intermediate actor veto

...
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
'6 See supra Subsection II.E.3.
167 Of course, if Congress cares enough about a given procedural change, it can always act directly to amend the relevant rules by statute.
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Thus a threshold question arises: should the intermediate actors
retain their veto rights, or should they be written out of the CR
process entirely? One could imagine a CR process in which Congress delegates negative-option authority to an advisory committee
alone.
I tentatively support retention of the intermediate actors, complete with full veto rights, notwithstanding the risk that they might
from time to time frustrate congressional preference. First, intermediate actor review and veto rights constitute a sort of informal,
anticipatory Marbury v. Madison review of procedural rules, and it
is likely that this form of review entails substantially lower net social costs than the alternative of full litigation.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution
guarantee that no person can be deprived of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."' The definition of "due process"
is necessarily implicated with every procedural rule. For example,
an amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 changing a
defendant's answer time from twenty days after service before potential default to, say, two days after service would likely be unconstitutional, even if such a rule accurately reflected a liberal Congress' desire to tilt the litigation playing field in plaintiff's favor.
Similarly, an amendment to Rule 11(c) providing for "treble
damages" sanctions for Rule 11 violations (that is, three times the
costs incurred by the prevailing party including attorneys' fees)
might well run afoul of the Constitution even if a conservative
Congress desired such a change to deter purportedly frivolous lawsuits.
Intermediate actor vetoes do present the risk that some otherwise legitimate congressional procedural preferences will not be
enacted, but they also provide ex ante assurance that new or
amended rules are at least facially constitutional. Moreover, this ex
ante assurance likely comes at lower net social cost than ex post
review. Under the current process, every new procedural rule carries the implicit constitutional imprimatur of the Supreme Court.
In the absence of intermediate actor review and sign-off, it is not
implausible to assume that the constitutionality of virtually every
new or amended procedural rule would be litigated.
" See U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
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In addition, retention of the intermediate player veto substantially mitigates any separation of powers concern arising out of
congressional selection of advisory committee members. The revised structure would still be dominated by Article III judges at
every level; more important, the judicial branch would retain an
absolute veto over new procedural rules at three separate levels of
the process: the Standing Committee, the Judicial Conference, and
the Supreme Court. These three sequential vetoes should be sufficient to ensure that the judicial branch retains effective control
over matters genuinely committed to its discretion by the Constitution.169
Finally, the universe of potential problems arising from retention
of the intermediate player veto is quite small. Congress retains and
occasionally exercises the right to enact procedural rules by statute."o Thus, assuming relative congruence of preferences between
an advisory committee and Congress, the only context in which
congressional preference could be frustrated by intermediate
player vetoes is one in which the strength of congressional preference is insufficient to generate affirmative legislation.
In such a scenario, the relevant advisory committee would propose a new rule consonant with congressional desires, the rule
would be vetoed by intermediate players who refused to forward
the rule up the chain, and Congress simply would not care enough
to enact its preferences into law. Such situations are likely to be
quite rare, especially because the congressional transaction costs

9 But see Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking, supra note 18, at 1286-87 (arguing that the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA) unconstitutionally usurped judicial branch authority by delegating rulemaking authority to local advisory committees and by "declaring procedural rules to be substantive law"). Given Professor
Mullenix's general hostility to congressional involvement in judicial affairs, it seems
unlikely that she would be willing to accept the reforms I propose. But the structure
this Article envisions does less actual harm to separation of powers than the CJRA,
insofar as it retains a traditional, centralized rulemaking structure with genuine judicial branch vetoes at intermediate levels. This Article's structure at least partially addresses Professor Mullenix's concern that "the power to prescribe internal rules of
procedure for the federal courts" is authority that "uniquely bears on the judicial
function." Mullenix, Counter-Reformation, supra note 18, at 379.
17oSee, e.g., H.R. Rep. 99-422 at 8-9, n.20 (1985) (listing instances of affirmative
congressional rulemaking); see also Extension of Power to Make Certain Examinations to Psychologists, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7047, 102 Stat. 4401 (1988) (amending
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to authorize mental examinations by psychologists).
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associated with enactment of a sympathetic advisory committee's
proposals would be substantially lower than those associated with
any congressional attempt to create a rules regime out of whole
cloth.
CONCLUSION

Game theory suggests that for all its advantages, the current incarnation of the committee rulemaking process may be susceptible
to transaction-cost arbitrage risk. A rationally under-informed
Congress may be willing to accept procedural equilibria some distance away from its "real" preferences simply to avoid incurring
the costs associated with informing itself and then acting. But at
the same time, the CR structure may reduce certain other risks of
strategic behavior, most notably interest group hijacking of the
rulemaking process.
The best way to mitigate transaction-cost-arbitrage risk without
surrendering the benefits of CR may be for Congress to retain the
basic CR structure, but to retain authority to appoint advisory
committees itself. Though this solution is incomplete and is not
without its own risks, it would mitigate the most significant transaction-cost-arbitrage risks without eviscerating an otherwise valuable
process.
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